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THE WRIGHT AMENDMENT: THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY AND PROPRIETY OF




OUTHWEST AIRLINES flies from Dallas Love Field
to Albuquerque. It also flies from Albuquerque to Los
Angeles. But if you tell a Southwest Airlines ticketing
representative that you would like to fly from Dallas to
Los Angeles, the representative will respond that no such
arrangement is available, and that you should try another
airline. The informed traveller, however, will recognize
that the representative is bluffing and will inquire further.
In fact, if you specifically tell the representative that you
would like to purchase two separate tickets, and that you
don't mind rechecking your luggage and waiting at least
forty-five minutes in between flights, then the representa-
tive will gladly make the necessary reservations for your
trip to Los Angeles.
This bizarre situation is a result of what is commonly
known as the "Wright Amendment."' Named after its au-
International Air Transportation Competition Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-
192, § 29, 94 Stat. 35, 48-49 (1980) [hereinafter Wright Amendment]. The
Wright Amendment provides:
Sec. 29. (a) Except as provided in subsection (c), notwithstanding
any other provision of law, neither the Secretary of Transportation,
the Civil Aeronautics Board, nor any other officer or employee of
the United States shall issue, reissue, amend, revise, or otherwise
modify (either by action or inaction) any certificate or other author-
ity to permit or otherwise authorize any person to provide the trans-
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thor, then-House Majority Leader Jim Wright of Fort
Worth, Texas, the Wright Amendment prohibits commer-
cial air carriers from providing service between Dallas
Love Field and destinations located outside of Texas and
its four surrounding states-Oklahoma, Arkansas, Louisi-
ana and New Mexico. 2 Further, under the Wright Amend-
ment, air carriers are prohibited from advertising or
listing "connecting" flights from an authorized Love Field
flight to a point beyond the Love Field service area.'
The purpose of this Comment is to (1) explore the his-
tory and purpose behind the Wright Amendment, (2) de-
termine whether the Wright Amendment is a
constitutional means of accomplishing the goals for which
portation of individuals, by air, as a common carrier for
compensation or hire between Love Field, Texas, and one or more
points outside the State of Texas, except (1) charter air transpora-
tion not to exceed ten flights per month, and (2) air transportation
provided by commuter airlines operating aircraft with a passenger
capacity of 56 passengers or less.
(b) Except as provided in subsections (a) and (c), notwithstanding
any other provision of law, or any certificate or other authority here-
tofore or hereafter issued thereunder, no person shall provide or
offer to provide the transportation of individuals, by air, for compen-
sation or hire as a common carrier between Love Field, Texas, and
one or more points outside the State of Texas, except that a person
providing service to a point outside the State of Texas from Love
Field on November 1, 1979, may continue to provide service to such
point.
(c) Subsections (a) and (b) shall not apply with respect to, and it is
found consistent with the public convenience and necessity to au-
thorize, transportation of individuals, by air, on a flight between
Love Field, Texas, and one or more points within the States of Loui-
siana, Arkansas, Oklahoma, New Mexico, and Texas by an air car-
rier, if (1) such air carrier does not offer or provide any through
service or ticketing with another air carrier or foreign air carrier, and
(2) such air carrier does not offer for sale transportation to or from,
and the flight or aircraft does not serve, any point which is outside
any such State. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to give
authority not otherwise provided by law to the Secretary of Trans-
portation, the Civil Aeronautics Board, any other officer or em-
ployee of the United States, or any other person.
Id.
2Id.
Id.; see Love Field Amendment Proceeding, Order No. 85-12-81, 51 Fed. Reg.
467, (Dep't Transp. Dec. 31, 1985) [hereinafter DOT Order] (interpreting Wright
Amendment).
it is intended, (3) analyze whether the goals of the Wright
Amendment have been satisfied and, if so, whether it
should be repealed, and (4) discuss the proper legislative
response to noise pollution issues if the Wright Amend-
ment is repealed.
Although focusing on Dallas Love Field, the scope of
this Comment covers issues that pertain to a number of
different airports throughout the country, particularly
those with perimeter rules. Airport perimeter rules gen-
erally establish maximum permissible distances of non-
stop flights into and out of a given airport. Two noted
examples of airports restricted by perimeter rules are
Washington, D.C.'s National Airport and New York City's
LaGuardia Airport. This Comment will explore why the
perimeter rules at those two airports were found constitu-
tional and, based on those precedents, whether the Love
Field perimeter rule would likewise survive constitutional
challenge. Also explored, through the example provided
at Love Field, is the impact of perimeter rules on the local
economy and on the consumers who fly into or out of re-
stricted airports. Finally, the Comment will try to deter-
mine which level of government-federal or local-is best
suited to impose perimeter rules.
II. HISTORY OF THE BATTLE OF LOVE FIELD
The Wright Amendment represents a culmination of
what has been, and continues to be, a long and intense
rivalry between the cities of Dallas and Fort Worth for the
business of commercial aviation and commercial air carri-
ers.4 Both cities intended to end this rivalry when they
joined together to build the Dallas/Ft.Worth Regional
Airport (DFW),5 located approximately midway between
4 See City of Dallas v. Southwest Airlines Co., 371 F. Supp. 1015, 1019-21 (N.D.
Tex. 1973) (prohibiting the City of Dallas from excluding Southwest Airlines from
Love Field), aft'd, 494 F.2d 773 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1079 (1974). See
generally S. Scorr & L. DAVIS, A GIANT IN TEXAS, A HISTORY OF THE DALLAS-FORT
WORTH REGIONAL AIRPORT CONTROVERSY 1911-1974 (1974).
See City of Dallas, 371 F. Supp. at 1019-21.
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Dallas and Fort Worth. Prior to construction of DFW,
both Dallas and Fort Worth-located 31 miles apart-op-
erated separate major airports. 6 Love Field, located six
miles from the center of downtown Dallas, had served as
the sole commercial airport in Dallas since 1927. 7 Until
the mid-1960's, the two cities could not agree on how to
consolidate all commercial air carrier services in one air-
port.8 This situation caused unnecessary expense for air
.carriers and area taxpayers and resulted in inadequate
and incomplete services for both cities.9
In 1964, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) provided
the impetus for creation of a new airport by ordering the
two cities to designate a single airport through which all
CAB-regulated carriers would serve the Dallas-Fort
Worth area.' 0 Four years later, the cities jointly adopted
the 1968 Regional Airport Concurrent Bond Ordinance," I
which authorized the issuance of Dallas-Fort Worth Re-
gional Airport Joint Revenue Bonds for the financing of
the new airport.' 2  Through this ordinance, the cities
agreed to
take such steps as may be necessary, appropriate and le-
gally permissible (without violating presently outstanding
legal commitments or covenants prohibiting such action),
to provide for the orderly, efficient and effective phase-out
at Love Field, Redbird, GSIA and Meacham Field, of any
and all Certificated Air Carrier Services, and to transfer
such activities to [DFW] effective upon the beginning of
Id.; S. ScoTr & L. DAVIS, supra note 4, at 1-3. Meacham Field, located five to
six miles north of Fort Worth, served as Fort Worth's primary airport until 1953
when Fort Worth opened a new airport, Greater Southwest International Airport
(GSIA), located midway between Dallas and Fort Worth. See id. at 5-23.
7 S. ScoTr & L. DAVIS, supra note 4, at 3.
6 See City of Dallas, 371 F. Supp. at 1019-21.
" Id. Dallas Love Field and Fort Worth's GSIA were located only twelve miles
apart; the two airports competed against one another for both passengers and
carriers. See S. Scorr & L. DAVIS, supra note 4, at 27-35.
,o City of Dallas, 371 F. Supp. at 1020; S. ScoTr & L. DAVIS, supra note 4, at 49.
I' Dallas, Tex., Regional Airport Concurrent Bond Ordinance 12,352; Fort
Worth, Tex., Regional Airport Concurrent Bond Ordinance No. 6021 [hereinaf-
ter, jointly, Bond Ordinance].
1' City of Dallas, 371 F. Supp. at 1020.
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operations at [DFW].' 3
The bond ordinance made clear that Dallas and Fort
Worth intended that all certificated air carriers serving the
Dallas-Fort Worth area be located at DFW. To this end,
both cities agreed in the bond ordinance to undertake no
action relating to the existing municipal airports-Love
Field, GSIA, Meacham Field, and Redbird-that would be
competitive with or in opposition to the optimum devel-
opment of DFW. 14
To carry out the mandate of the bond ordinance, the
DFW Airport Board executed letters of agreement in
1974 with each of the eight CAB certificated air carriers
then serving the Dallas-Fort Worth area. 15 The letters of
agreement required each signatory airline to "move all of
its Certificated Air Carrier Services serving the Dallas-
Is Bond Ordinance, supra note 11, § 9.5(A).
1 Id. § 9.5(B). Section 9.5(B) states the following:
In addition to the covenant of the Cities contained in paragraph A,
next above, regarding the transfer of Certificated Air Carrier Serv-
ices, the Cities further agree that they will through every legal and
reasonable means promote the optimum development of the lands
and Facilities comprising the Regional Airport at the earliest practi-
cable date, thus to assure the receipt of Gross Revenues therefrom
to the maximum extent possible, and neither the Cities nor the
Board will undertake with regard to the Regional Airport, Love
Field, GSIA, Meacham Field or Redbird, any action, implement any
policy, or enter into any agreement or contract which by its or their
nature would be competitive with or in oppositon to the optimum
development of the Regional Airport and use of its lands and Facili-
ties at the earliest practicable date; and none of the airports of the
Cities shall be put to or developed for any use which by the nature
therof the optimum use and development of the Regional Airport,
including its air and land space, at the earliest practicable date will
be impaired, diminished, reduced, or destroyed. It is provided,
however, that nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to pro-
hibit the promotion and full development of the operation or rea-
sonable Aircraft uses (other than Certificated Air Carrier Services) at
Love Field, Redbird and Meacham Field, or Aircraft operations of
any type at GSIA if the same shall be made a part of the Regional
Airport. Otherwise, Aircraft uses at GSIA shall not be permitted af-
ter the Regional Airport becomes operational.
Id.
, City of Dallas, 371 F. Supp. at 1020-21. The carriers were American Airlines,
Braniff Airways, Continental Airlines, Delta Air Lines, Eastern Air Lines, Frontier
Airlines, Ozark Air Lines and Texas International Airlines. Id. at 1021 n. 1.
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Fort Worth area to [DFW] . . . to the extent required
under the terms of the 1968 Regional Airport Concurrent
Bond Ordinance."' 6 Through these agreements, every
CAB-regulated airline then serving Love Field legally
committed itself to move its operations to DFW once the
airport was completed.
On June 18, 1971, after the other airlines committed
themselves to DFW, but before the airport's completion,
Southwest Airlines commenced purely intrastate opera-
tions as a "commuter airline" offering flights from Dallas
Love Field to Houston and San Antonio, pursuant to Cer-
tificate of Public Convenience and Necessity No. 22 issued
by the Texas Aeronautics Commission (TAC).17 This cer-
tificate authorized Southwest to serve the Dallas-Fort
Worth region through any airport in the area.' 8 On Octo-
ber 20, 1971, Southwest informed the Regional Airport
Board that it intended to remain at Love Field when the
eight CAB certificated airlines moved from Love Field to
DFW.' 9
Because of this decision by Southwest, the cities of Dal-
las and Fort Worth and the Dallas-Fort Worth Regional
Airport Board, DFW's operator, sued for a declaratory
judgment that they were entitled under federal and state
law to exclude Southwest from Love Field once DFW
opened. 20 The plaintiffs in City of Dallas v. Southwest Air-
lines Co. were motivated by fear that Southwest's contin-
ued operation at Love Field would undermine the
financial success of the new airport.2'
The district court in City of Dallas held that because
Southwest provided purely intrastate services, Southwest
was not subject to the 1964 CAB ruling that all CAB regu-
16 Id. at 1021.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id. Southwest also discontinued its participation in planning sessions for the
transfer of airline service from Love Field to DFW. Id.
20 Id. at 1019.
21 See id. at 1025.
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lated carriers be moved to one airport.22 At that time, no
carrier could provide interstate air transportation with
large aircraft without a certificate granted by the CAB au-
thorizing such service.23 Because Southwest's services
were purely intrastate, however, Southwest did not need
certification from the CAB. 24 Thus, the court found that
the CAB had no jurisdiction over Southwest.2 5 The court
then concluded that, under federal and state law, South-
west Airlines could not be excluded from using Love Field
as long as it remained open as an airport. 6
For several years, Southwest operated flights only
within Texas. After Congress enacted the Airline Deregu-
lation Act of 1978,27 however, Southwest requested oper-
ating authority from the CAB for a Love Field-New
Orleans route under the new statute's liberalized proce-
dures. 28  The Airline Deregulation Act substantially
changed the federal government's regulatory control over
air transportation. 29 This Act contains a provision known
as the Automatic Market Entry (AME) program that al-
lowed carriers to enter certain markets prior to complete
route deregulation without a CAB finding that entry was
needed.30 The CAB concluded that, under the AME pro-
22 Id. at 1021-22.
23 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 401, 49 U.S.C. § 1371 (1976).
24 City of Dallas, 371 F. Supp. at 1022.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 1035. The court concluded that the airport phase-out provisions of the
Regional Airport Concurrent Bond Ordinance did not apply to Southwest Air-
lines. Id. In section 9.5 of the ordinance, Dallas pledged to phase out services at
Love Field to the extent legally possible. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
"Since the Court has found that the exclusion of Southwest Airlines from Love
Field would not be legally permissible, in part because it would violate presently
outstanding legal commitments or covenants, the phase-out provision of the Or-
dinance is declared not applicable to Southwest Airlines." City of Dallas, 371 F.
Supp. at 1035.
27 49 U.S.C. app. § 1302 (1982).
28 See Southwest Airlines, Automatic Market Entry, CAB Order No. 79-9-192
(Sept. 28, 1979).
- DOT Order, supra note 3, at 3.
s0 Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, § 12, 49 U.S.C. § 1371(d)(7) (1982). The
AME provision states the following:
Not later than the sixtieth day after the date on which the [CAB]
receives an application from an applicant under this subparagraph,
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vision, Southwest could provide interstate service from
Love Field."'
III. THE WRIGHT AMENDMENT
The CAB ruling allowing Southwest to provide inter-
state service from Love Field heightened fear that Love
Field would draw unacceptable levels of traffic from
DFW.32 No doubt, many feared that the relationship be-
tween Love Field and DFW might become similar to that
between Washington, D.C.'s National Airport and Dulles
Airport. Although expansive and modern, Dulles contin-
ues to suffer from a shortage of passengers, largely be-
cause the older and overcrowded National Airport is
conveniently located, making it the airport of choice for
most passengers travelling to and from Washington,
D.C. 3 Many Texas officials, particularly those in Fort
Worth, worried that Southwest and other airlines would
begin to fly all over the country from Love Field, thus
drawing traffic away from DFW and endangering DFW's
the [CAB] shall issue a certificate to such applicant for the nonstop
service specified in such application, unless within such sixty-day pe-
riod the [CAB] determines that the applicant is not fit, willing, and
able to provide such nonstop service and to conform to the provi-
sions of this Act and the rules, regulations, and requirements of the
[CAB] issued under this Chapter.
Id., construed in Southwest Airlines, Automatic Market Entry, CAB Order No. 79-9-
192, at 3 (Sept. 28, 1979).
31 Southwest Airlines, Automatic Market Entry, CAB Order No. 79-9-192 (Sept.
28, 1979). The CAB stated,
We are persuaded by the clear language of section 401(d)(7) and the
legislative history of the automatic market entry section of the Act
that our authority to deny a [sic] application is highly circumscribed
unless the carrier is unfit and that, on the facts before us, we have no
discretion to deny the application.
Id. at 2-3.
32 See generally Holsendolph, Wrangle Over Texas Airport, N.Y. Times, Nov. 28,
1979, § 4, at 1, col. 4 (discussing positions of various legislators during the debate
over passage of the Wright Amendment).
3 See City of Houston v. FAA, 679 F.2d 1184 (5th Cir. 1982). National Airport
lies directly across the Potomac River from downtown Washington D.C. and is
conveniently served by Washington D.C.'s subway network. Id. at 1186. Dulles,
on the other hand, is 30 miles from downtown, and travel time to the airport
generally exceeds 45 minutes. Id. at 1187.
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financial stability.3 4
One such official was Congressman Jim Wright of Fort
Worth, who in 1979 introduced an amendment to the In-
ternational Air Transportation Competition Act (IATCA)
that effectively prohibited all interstate air service at Love
Field.3 5 The final legislation eventually adopted by both
houses, however, provided a more flexible limitation on
interstate commercial passenger service. Found in sec-
tion 29 of the IATCA,3 6 the "Wright Amendment" was
designed to except Love Field from the liberalized market
entry provisions of the Airline Deregulation Act.3 7
The Wright Amendment contains three subsections,
each expressed in what one court characterized as "dread-
fully framed language." ' 8 Subsection (a) essentially states
a general rule prohibiting all interstate passenger service
to or from Love Field. Two of the three exceptions to this
ban on interstate passenger service are contained in sub-
section (a). This subsection permits the operation of ten
interstate charter flights each month to and from Love
Field,3 9 and allows interstate commuter service by airlines
operating aircraft with a capacity of fifty-six passengers or
less. 40 Subsection (b) grandfathers all commercial inter-
state passenger service existing at Love Field prior to No-
vember 1, 1979.4t Subsection (b) is aimed specifically at
Southwest's Love Field-New Orleans route, the only ser-
vice falling within the statute's terms in 1979.42 This sub-
section, however, is rendered meaningless by subsection
(c).
34 See Zimmerman, Southwest, Love Field's Strong Ties, Dallas Morning News, Jan.
8, 1989, at HI, col. 2.
95 H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 96-716, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1980); DOT Order,
supra note 3, at 3. See generally Holsendolph, supra note 32.
'. Wright Amendment, supra note 1.
37 Continental Air Lines v. Department of Transp., 843 F.2d 1444, 1446 (D.C.
Cir. '1988) (upholding DOT interpretation of Wright Amendment which permit-
ted service at Love Field by Continental Air Lines).
38 Id.
39 Wright Amendment, supra note 1, § 29(a)(1).
40 Id.
4, Id. § 29(b).
42 H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 96-716, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1980).
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Subsection (c) provides the most significant exception
to the Wright Amendment's ban on commercial interstate
passenger service. This subsection permits turnaround
service between Love Field and points inside the four
states contiguous to Texas: Louisiana, Arkansas,
Oklahoma, and New Mexico (the "Love Field Service
Area").43 Subsection (c) contains additional language
stating that an air carrier may provide interstate service
only if it (1) does not offer or provide any through service
or ticketing with another air carrier, 44 and (2) does not
offer connecting service to points outside the Love Field
Service Area.45
The precise meaning of the additional restrictions
found in subsection (c) were not fully explored until Con-
tinental Air Lines attempted to establish passenger ser-
vice between Love Field and Houston in 1985.46 The
cities of Dallas and Fort Worth and the Dallas-Fort Worth
International Airport Board (the "DFW parties") opposed
this move.47 Their opposition first took the form of a re-
quest that the Department of Transportation (DOT) for-
mally interpret subsection (c). 48  When the DOT
construed the subsection against the interests of the DFW
parties, however, they petitioned the D.C. Circuit for re-
view of the DOT's order.4 9
The DFW parties first argued that subsection (c)(1) bars
from Love Field any carrier that provides interline serv-
ices anywhere on their systems, even if no interlining ser-
vice is provided on flights serving Love Field.50 "Interline
service" occurs when a carrier has connecting flights with
11 Wright Amendment, supra note 1, § 29(c).
44 Id. § 29(c)(1).
45 Id. § 29(c)(2).
4 See DOT Order, supra note 3, at 4-5.
41 Id. at 1. The DFW parties' opposition to Continental's proposed service ap-
parently rested on the presumption that expanded interstate operations at Love
Field would harm DFW Airport. See id. at 2-3.
48 Id.
49 Continental, 843 F.2d at 1445.
-o Id. at 1447; DOT Order, supra note 3, at 4.
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other airlines.5 1 Under the DFW parties' interpretation,
Continental Air Lines would be prohibited from using
Love Field; although Continental did not intend to pro-
vide interline service in Houston for its Love Field flights,
it did have interline agreements with other carriers else-
where on its system.52 On the other hand, this interpreta-
tion would not affect Southwest Airlines because it did not
interline with other carriers elsewhere on its system. 5 3
The DOT, however, rejected this interpretation. 54 The
DOT found that the subclause did not prohibit noninter-
line service at Love Field by an air carrier providing inter-
line service elsewhere on its system. 55 The United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit up-
held the DOT's interpretation, thus permitting Continen-
tal to provide commercial passenger service to Houston
from Love Field.5 6
Continental's battle to establish Love Field service also
helped clarify subsection (c)(2) of the Wright Amend-
ment.5 7 The DOT concluded that subsection (c)(2) does
not preclude an airline from "double ticketing."58 As de-
scribed by the D.C. Circuit in Continental, double ticketing
"involves the purchase by a passenger of two separate
tickets: one for service from Love Field to a point within
Texas or the four adjacent states (Love Field Service
Area), and a separate, second ticket for service from that
destination to a point beyond the authorized Love Field
Service Area."'59 When double ticketed, the passenger
must endure certain inconveniences not ordinarily associ-
ated with air travel. For instance, the passenger must pay
51 Continental, 843 F.2d at 1445.
2 DOT Order, supra note 3, at 4.
5, Id. at 4 n.4.
- Id. at 5.
55 Id.
- Continental, 843 F.2d at 1453-54. To date, Continental has not implemented
such service.
'5 Wright Amendment, supra note 1, § 29(c)(2). For the text of subsection
(c)(2), see supra note 1.
-1 DOT Order, supra note 3, at 11-12.
-9 Continental, 843 F.2d at 1455 (quoting DOT's brief).
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separate fares and must reclaim checked baggage upon
arrival at the connecting point and recheck it on the next
flight on his or her itinerary.60
Interestingly, although the DOT found that double tick-
eting was perfectly legal, it decided that airlines were pro-
hibited from advertising, promoting, or otherwise
affirmatively soliciting double ticketing passengers. 6 l The
prohibition on advertising was apparently based on the
language in subsection (c) (2) prohibiting air carriers from
offering for sale transportation to or from any point outside
the Love Field Service Area.62 The DOT further found
that the prohibition against advertising double ticketing
service applied to other related activities. Specifically, the
DOT found that an air carrier could not (1) display in its
computer reservations system connecting service from the
Love Field Service Area to points outside that area, (2)
display Love Field connecting service in its flight sched-
ules, or (3) offer a constructed fare (a fare different from
the sum of the local fares) for double ticketing service
originating or terminating at Love Field.63
The DOT stated, however, that the prohibition against
offering to sell double ticketing service did not prevent an
airline from providing that service, so long as the service
was unsolicited. 64 The DOT concluded that a carrier that
simply "responds to a customer's unsolicited request...
has not proposed to sell air transportation, but, rather,
has accepted a proposal to buy such transportation from
the customer .... ,,65 This policy creates the perverse sit-
uation in which a travel agent or airline ticketing repre-
sentative may only provide double ticketing service if the
would-be traveller is sophisticated enough to expressly re-
quest such service.
- See DOT Order, supra note 3, at 10-11.
61 Id. at 11.
62 Wright Amendment, supra note 1, § 29(c)(2).
61 DOT Order, supra note 3, at 12.
- Id. at 11-12.
- Id. at 11.
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IV. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE WRIGHT AMENDMENT
A. Prior Constitutional Challenges to Perimeter Rules
To date, no court has addressed the constitutionality of
the Wright Amendment.66 Similar restrictions at other
major airports, however, have been challenged on consti-
tutional grounds. Perimeter rules imposed at both Wash-
ington, D.C.'s National Airport (National) and New York's
LaGuardia Airport (LaGuardia) have withstood constitu-
tional challenges.67 The cases involving these two perim-
eter rules demonstrate the types of issues and legal
theories that would likely shape a court's ruling on the
constitutionality of the Wright Amendment. Although
the perimeter rules at both National and LaGuardia were
held constitutional, there are unique characteristics of the
Wright Amendment and the situation at Love Field, as
will be shown below, that establish a more credible case
for the unconstitutionality of the Wright Amendment.
1. City of Houston v. FAA
The first and most comprehensive decision involving a
constitutional challenge to an airport perimeter rule was
City of Houston v. FAA .68 In this suit, Houston sought re-
view of a 1000 mile perimeter rule imposed on Washing-
ton, D.C.'s National Airport. 69 National's perimeter rule,
A private citizen recently challenged the Wright Amendment on constitu-
tional grounds, but the court dismissed the case for lack of standing and did not
address the underlying claim. Cramer v. Skinner, No. 3-89-1029-G (N.D. Tex.
Apr. 11, 1990). At the time of publication the case was on appeal to the Fifth
Circuit.
67 See City of Houston v. FAA, 679 F.2d 1184 (5th Cir. 1982) (upholding the
1000 mile perimeter rule at National Airport); Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Port
Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 658 F. Supp. 952 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (upholding the 1500 mile
perimeter rule at LaGuardia Airport), aff'd, 817 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1987) cert. denied
sub nom. Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 485 U.S. 1006 (1988).
- 679 F.2d at 1184.
6 Id. at 1186. National's 1000 mile perimeter rule was expanded to 1250 miles
in 1986 as part of the Metropolitan Washington Airports Act of 1986, 49 U.S.C.
§§ 2451-2461 (Supp. V 1987). The new perimeter rule states that "an air carrier
may not operate an aircraft nonstop in air transportation between Washington
National Airport and another airport that is more than 1,250 statute miles away
from Washington National Airport." 49 U.S.C. § 2461. For an overview of the
1990] 1023
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promulgated by the airport proprietor, the FAA,7 0 prohib-
ited nonstop carrier service between National and any air-
port more than 1000 miles away from National. 7' The
perimeter rule required travellers flying to National from
a city outside the perimeter to stop or change planes in a
city within the 1000 mile perimeter.72 The restriction on
National was designed to serve several purposes: (1) as-
sure full utilization of nearby Dulles airport, (2) preserve
the short and medium haul nature of National, and (3) re-
duce the noise pollution and congestion at National.73
Most of the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in upholding the
statute focused on whether the Federal Aviation Act74
granted the FAA authority to impose a perimeter rule75
and whether the FAA violated the Administrative Proce-
dure Act76 by acting arbitrarily or without a rational basis
in promulgating the 1000 mile perimeter rule.77 The City
of Houston court concluded that the FAA had not exceeded
purpose and history of the perimeter rules at National, LaGuardia, and Love
Field, see Cross, Airport Perimeter Rules: An Exception to Federal Preemption, 17
TRANsp. LJ. 101 (1988).
70 City of Houston, 679 F.2d at 1186.
71 Id. at 1189 n.8.
72 Id. at 1187.
7 Id. at 1188. The origin of the perimeter rule can be traced to a noise abate-
ment suit brought by a coalition of citizen groups and individuals against the
DOT, the FAA, and eleven major airlines. Id., referring to Virginians for Dulles v.
Volpe, 344 F. Supp. 573 (E.D. Va. 1972), aff'd in part, rev'd and remanded in part, 541
F.2d 442 (4th Cir. 1976). In Virginians for Dulles the court ordered the FAA to
prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) concerning National and Dul-
les. Virginiansfor Dulles, 541 F.2d at 445-46. The 1000 mile perimeter rule was
first proposed in the EIS. City of Houston, 679 F.2d at 1188.
74 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (codified as
amended at 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1301-1552 (1982)).
75 City of Houston, 679 F.2d at 1193-96. In determining whether the FAA pos-
sessed authority to impose a perimeter rule, the court considered two aspects of
the Federal Aviation Act: (1) the powers granted to local airport proprietors (49
U.S.C. app. § 1305 (1982)), and (2) the powers granted specifically to the FAA (49
U.S.C. app. §§ 1303, 1348(a), 1353(a), 1354(a) (1982)).
76 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (1982). The Administrative Procedure Act prohibits
agency action that is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law" or other prescribed methods of administrative action.
Id., quoted in City of Houston, 679 F.2d at 1190.
77 City of Houston, 679 F.2d at 1190-93.
its authority by imposing the perimeter rule 78 and that the
perimeter rule had a rational basis.79
The Fifth Circuit also considered two constitutional
challenges to National's perimeter rule. First, the court
considered whether the perimeter rule violated the port
preference clause, which reads: "No preference shall be
given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the
Ports of one State over those of another: nor shall vessels
bound to, or from one State, be obliged to enter, clear or
pay Duties to another."80 Houston argued that the FAA's
actions essentially granted a preference to the ports of
states falling within the perimeter because only those air-
ports within 1000 miles were privileged to offer nonstop
service to National.8 1
The court began its analysis by noting that the term
"port" includes airports.8 2 After surveying the relevant
case authority involving the port preference clause, 3 the
court created a formula for use in determining whether an
act violates the port preference clause. The Fifth Circuit
held as follows:
Government actions do not violate the Clause even if they
result in some detriment to the port of a state, where they
occur (i) as an incident to some otherwise legitimate gov-
ernment act regulating commerce or (ii) more as a result
of the accident of geography than from an intentional gov-
ernmental preference. 4
78 Id. at 1196.
79 Id. at 1190-91. For further discussion of the holding of City of Houston, see
Cross, supra note 69, at 101.
8 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 6.
81 City of Houston, 679 F.2d at 1196.
82 Id. at 1196 n.18.
83 Alabama Great S. R.R. v. United States, 340 U.S. 216 (1951) (upholding an
Interstate Commerce Commission order which allegedly favored the port of New
Orleans); South Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U.S. 4 (1876) (upholding the federal gov-
ernment's actions in dredging the Savannah River even though dredging hin-
dered access to a South Carolina port); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont
Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1856) (upholding a federal statute which pro-
vided for construction of a bridge in West Virginia that blocked some vessels from
entering the port of Pittsburgh).
City of Houston, 679 F.2d at 1197.
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The court found that any detriment suffered by the ports
outside the perimeter was an accident of geography and
not a product of deliberate discrimination against the
western states.85 Hence, the court held that the perimeter
rule did not violate the port preference clause.8 6
The second constitutional challenge considered was
whether the perimeter rule violated the passengers' con-
stitutional right to travel.87 On this issue, the court cited
Shapiro v. Thompson 8 as the landmark decision involving
the right to travel.89 In Shapiro, the Supreme Court struck
down a state residency requirement for welfare recipients
on the ground that it violated the constitutional right to
travel freely from state to state. 90 The City of Houston court
narrowly interpreted Shapiro, concluding that, because the
perimeter rule did not act as a residency requirement, the
right to travel was not implicated. 9' Finally, the court
noted that passengers have no right to the most conve-
nient form of travel, apparently referring to the fact that
passengers outside the perimeter could fly nonstop to
Dulles or take a non-nonstop flight to National.9 2
2. Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Port Authority of New
York & New Jersey
The most recent court decision involving a perimeter
- Id. at 1198.
- Id. The court did not explicitly consider whether the perimeter rule satisfied
the first prong of the port preference test but did state that it believed the port
preference clause did not apply when the rule adopted was "facially neutral." Id.
81 Id. For a discussion of the right to travel and its constitutional sources, see
infra notes 123-146 and accompanying text.
8m 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
89 City of Houston, 679 F.2d at 1198.
Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 618. In Shapiro, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and the Dis-
trict of Columbia denied welfare benefits to residents who had not resided in the
jurisdiction for at least a year. The Court held that requiring a one-year waiting
period impaired the fundamental right to interstate travel. Id. For further discus-
sion of the Shapiro framework, see infra notes 167-172 and accompanying text.
9, City of Houston, 679 F.2d at 1198.
' Id. "At most, their argument reduces to the feeble claim that passengers
have a constitutional right to the most convenient form of travel. That notion, as
any traveler can attest, finds no support whatsoever in Shapiro or in the airlines'
own schedules." Id.
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rule is Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Port Authority of New York &
New Jersey,93 where both the District Court for the South-
ern District of New York and the Second Circuit upheld a
1500 mile perimeter rule at LaGuardia Airport. The Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey, LaGuardia's pro-
prietor,94 imposed a perimeter rule prohibiting airlines
from running nonstop flights beyond a 1500 mile perime-
ter.95 The purpose behind the rule was to reduce ground
congestion and maintain LaGuardia as a short and me-
dium haul airport by diverting longer haul traffic to
nearby Kennedy and Newark Airports.96
Western Air Lines, which maintains its major hub in
Salt Lake City, almost 2000 miles from LaGuardia, alleged
that LaGuardia's proprietor exceeded its authority by im-
posing the perimeter rule.9 7 Specifically, Western argued
that the perimeter rule impermissibly regulated Western's
routes and services in violation of section 105(a)(1) of the
Deregulation Act. 98 The district court rejected this claim,
concluding that the imposition of a perimeter rule fell
within the proprietary power99 of the Port Authority to
93 658 F. Supp. 952 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd, 817 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1987).
- 658 F. Supp. at 953.
95 Id. The 1984 perimeter rule replaced an informal 2000 mile perimeter rule
that had been in effect since the late 1950's. Id. The Port Authority imposed the
formal perimeter rule when Air Canada Airlines threatened to violate the informal
one. Cross, supra note 69, at 104.
96 Western Air Lines, 658 F. Supp. at 953. LaGuardia is the smallest of the three
airports. Id.
9' Id. at 954-58. For a more detailed analysis of this claim, see Cross, supra note
69, at 111-13.
98 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 105(a)(1), as amended, 49 U.S.C. app.
§ 1305(a)(1). Section 105(a)(l) is a preemption statute. It provides the following:
[N]o State or political subdivision thereof and no interstate agency
or other political agency of two or more States shall enact or enforce
any law, rule, regulation, standard, or other provision having the
force and effect of law relating to rates, routes, or services of any air
carrier having authority under subchapter IV of this chapter to pro-
vide air transportation.
Id.
9 Id. § 105(b)(l), 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305(b)(1). Section 105(b)(l) reserves cer-
tain powers and rights for the local airport proprietor. It provides the following:
Nothing in subsection (a) of this section shall be construed to limit
the authority of any State or political subdivision thereof or any in-
terstate agency or other political agency of two or more States as the
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regulate ground congestion. 00
The court next considered whether the perimeter rule
impermissibly discriminated against Western Air Lines.' 0 '
Western argued that the perimeter rule discriminated
against carriers that maintained hubs outside the perime-
ter and made it difficult for those carriers to compete with
airlines whose hubs lie inside the perimeter. 0 2 Answer-
ing this claim, the district court referred approvingly to
City of Houston and reasoned that the discrimination suf-
fered by Western was "an accident of geography" and not
a result of deliberate discrimination against certain
states.'0 3  The court stated that the determining test is
whether the discrimination is reasonable in light of the le-
gitimate objectives to be achieved.'0 4 In this case, the
court concluded that imposition of a perimeter rule was a
reasonable way to reduce congestion at LaGuardia and
maintain its status as a short and medium haul airport.'0,5
owner or operator of an airport served by any air carrier certified by
the Board to exercise its proprietary powers and rights.
Id. Western Air Lines argued that the proprietor's powers and rights were limited
to regulating noise pollution. Western Air Lines, 658 F. Supp. at 956. The district
court, however, held that the proprietary power also extended to other areas, such
as ground congestion. Id. at 957. Because the Port Authority had imposed the
perimeter rule largely to regulate ground congestion, the court upheld the rule.
Id. at 958.
- Western Air Lines, 658 F. Supp. at 957-58.
lo, Id. Western Air Lines claimed that the discrimination violated the com-
merce clause of the United States Constitution, art. I, § 8, cl. 3, provisions of the
Airport & Airway Improvement Act, 49 U.S.C. § 2210 (1982), and the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. app. § 1349(a). Western Air Lines, 658 F. Supp. at
954-55. Western Air Lines also alleged, but did not argue, that the perimeter rule
violated Western's rights under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1982), and the equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution. Western Air Lines, 650 F. Supp. at
954 n.7.
02 Western Air Lines, 658 F. Supp. at 958. Western's major competitors operated
from a Denver hub explicitly exempted from LaGuardia's perimeter rule. Id.
,o Id. at 958-59.
- Id. at 959. "In truth, all regulations tend to discriminate in some way ....
The critical inquiry is whether the'discrimination is unjust ...." Id.
o Id. at 960. "In setting in place a formal rule, therefore, and in light of the
prospect of ever burgeoning traffic at LaGuardia, it was not unreasonable to im-
pose a 1500-mile limit. This is especially true when access to the New York area
remains unimpeded at the other area airports." Id.
COMMENTS
On appeal, the Second Circuit unanimously affirmed the
district court's decision in all respects.'t 6
B. Wright Amendment Distinguished from Perimeter Rules at
National and LaGuardia Airports
The perimeter rules at Love Field, National, and La-
Guardia are all similar in that they are designed to restrict
the use of an older, smaller airport in order to assure the
full utilization of a nearby, less convenient airport. It
should be noted, however, that the situation at Love Field
is different than that at either National or LaGuardia;
while the latter two airports currently operate at or above
capacity levels, 0 7 Love Field operates well below its ca-
pacity.' 08 Furthermore, DFW, unlike Dulles, is presently a
fully utilized facility rapidly approaching its own capacity
level.' 0 9 Therefore, the rationale for imposing a perime-
ter rule at Love Field on that basis is less convincing than
at either National or LaGuardia.
Another important distinction between the Wright
Amendment and perimeter rules at other airports is that
the perimeter rule at Love Field was imposed not by an
administrative agency (National) or by a local proprietor
(LaGuardia). 1 ° Instead, it was promulgated by the
- Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 817 F.2d 222 (2d Cir.
1987), cert. denied sub nom. Delta Air Lines, Inc., v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 485
U.S. 1006 (1988).
107 In 1982, when the Fifth Circuit reviewed the perimeter rule at National Air-
port, 17 million passengers per year, and up to 3500 passengers per hour, were
passing through National. City of Houston, 679 F.2d at 1186. Furthermore, 67% of
all air traffic in the metropolitan Washington D.C. area belonged to National. Id.
Comparing National to Dulles, the Fifth Circuit stated, "As overcrowding plagues
National ... , during most of the day the younger sister pines away, unwanted."
Id. at 1187. LaGuardia Airport is equally congested. In upholding LaGuardia's
perimeter rule, the district court in Western Air Lines took note of the fact that
traffic at LaGuardia is nearly always at capacity levels and sometimes exceeds ca-
pacity by as much as 23%. Western Air Lines, 658 F. Supp. at 959.
lot Love Field currently operates at less than 50% capacity. For a discussion of
Love Field's capacity level, see infra notes 228-236 and accompanying text.
-0 See infra notes 208-222 and accompanying text.
110 For a discussion of the perimeter rule at National, see supra notes 68-73 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of the perimeter rule at LaGuardia, see supra
notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
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United States Congress."' This raises several distinctions
making the Wright Amendment more difficult to attack.
First, it means that the most significant arguments used to
attack the perimeter rules at National and LaGuardia will
not be available against the Wright Amendment. Both the
City of Houston and Western Air Lines courts were most trou-
bled by the issue of whether the proprietors of those air-
ports had exceeded or contradicted the authority granted
local proprietors by Congress." t2 In the case of the
Wright Amendment, however, Congress itself passed the
statute.
The second distinction is that the commerce clause may
not be used to attack the Wright Amendment. Under the
current doctrine, courts will uphold commerce-based laws
if there is any rational basis upon which Congress could
have found some relationship between its regulation and
interstate commerce." 13 There can be little doubt that a
court would find that the Wright Amendment satisfies this
deferential standard. If, on the other hand, a local propri-
etor had imposed the perimeter rule, the commerce
clause could be used to attack the rule as an undue bur-
den on interstate commerce.' t4
Finally, the fact that the Love Field perimeter rule was
promulgated by Congress could, and should, affect the
level of deference a court will show the legislation. In the
recent case of Mistretta v. United States," 5 the Supreme
Court stated that "[w]hen this Court is asked to invalidate
a statutory provision that has been approved by both
Houses of the Congress and signed by the President,...
it should only do so for the most compelling constitu-
I See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
"12 See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text (discussing National) and notes
97-100 and accompanying text (discussing LaGuardia).
I J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 4.8, at 148
(1986).
,,4 See, e.g., Western Air Lines, 658 F. Supp. at 958.
'- 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989).
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tional reasons."'1 6 If, on the other hand, the Love Field
restrictions had been promulgated by its proprietor, the
City of Dallas, a court would likely be less deferential."17
Although the fact that the Love Field perimeter rule
was promulgated by Congress creates additional hurdles
to judicial review, there are also a number of characteris-
tics of the Wright Amendment and Love Field itself that
make the case against the constitutionality of the legisla-
tion stronger than the cases against the perimeter rules at
National and LaGuardia.
First, the infringement on the passenger's fundamental
right to interstate travel is significantly greater under the
Love Field perimeter rule than it is at either National or
LaGuardia. The perimeter rules at National and LaGuar-
dia require merely that a passenger stop at a city within
the perimeter. The Love Field passenger must change
planes and purchase separate tickets for the two flights.
The National or LaGuardia passenger may purchase a
through fare and is not, as is the Love Field passenger,
required to claim and recheck his or her luggage before
boarding a different flight for the final destination. The
Wright Amendment's prohibition on advertising of
double ticketing services further burdens the Love Field
passenger by preventing him from obtaining information
necessary to facilitate his crossing certain state borders.
Second, the discrimination against states (and their
ports) outside the Love Field perimeter is more extensive
,,6 Id. at 661, quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986) (concurring
opinion).
17 See, e.g., British Airways Bd. v. Port Auth., 564 F.2d 1002, 1010-11 (2d Cir.
1977).
The maintenance of a fair and efficient system of air commerce, of
course, mandates that each airport operator be circumscribed to the
issuance of reasonable, nonarbitrary and nondiscriminatory rules
defining the permissible level of'noise which can be created by air-
craft using the airport. We must carefully scrutinize all exercises of
local power under this rubric to insure that impermissible parochial
considerations do not unconstitutionally burden interstate com-
merce or inhibit the accomplishment of legitimate national goals.
Id. at 1011 (citations omitted).
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and explicit than the discrimination against states outside
the National and LaGuardia perimeters."'
C. The Constitutional Basis for Challenging the Wright
Amendment
The following analysis explores the constitutionality of
the Wright Amendment from two perspectives: (1) the
passenger who attempts to fly from Love Field to a state
outside the Love Field Service Area, and (2) the states
which lie outside the Love Field Service Area. The pas-
senger's constitutional claim rests on the argument that
his fundamental right to travel is unjustifiably infringed
upon. This argument was considered (and rejected) by
the court in City of Houston v. FAA, l l9 which involved the
perimeter rule at National Airport. States which lie
outside of the Love Field Service Area may base their con-
stitutional claim on the fact that the Wright Amendment
discriminates between the ports of states not mentioned
in the statute and the ports of states explicitly included.
Discrimination of this sort was considered in City of Hous-
ton 1 2 ) and also, in a somewhat different context, in Western
Air Lines, Inc. v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey.' 2 1
Protection from this type of discrimination is found, ar-
guably, in the port preference clause of the United States
Constitution. 122
1. The Fundamental Right to Interstate Travel
The right to travel between and among the states has
"8 See supra notes 80-86 for a discussion of the port preference clause and its
prohibition of discrimination against the ports of one state in favor of the ports of
another state.
1,9 679 F.2d 1184, 1198 (5th Cir. 1982). For a discussion of this claim, see supra
notes 80-92 and accompanying text.
120 City of Houston, 679 F.2d at 1198. For a discussion of this claim, see supra
notes 80-92 and accompanying text.
121 658 F. Supp. 952 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd 817 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1987). In this
case, the plaintiff, an air carrier, argued that the perimeter rule at LaGuardia Air-
port unfairly discriminated against carriers that maintained their hubs outside of
the perimeter. Id. at 958.
122 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 6.
[55
1990] COMMENTS 1033
been recognized as a fundamental constitutional right.' 23
Addressing this right, the United States Supreme Court
has stated the following:
This court long ago recognized that the nature of our Fed-
eral Union and our constitutional concepts of personal lib-
erty unite to require that all citizens be free to travel
throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhib-
ited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably
burden or restrict this movement. 
24
Locating the source of this right, however, has been an
elusive task.' 25 An overview of the cases in which a funda-
mental right to travel has been found reveals at least six
12- Attorney Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 911 (1986) (invalidating
state constitutional and statutory provisions that gave preference in civil service
employment to residents of the state who were veterans of the armed services and
who had lived in the state when they entered the military); Hooper v. Bernalillo
County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612, 624 (1985) (invalidating state statute that granted
a property tax exemption to veterans who became residents of the state before a
certain date); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 65 (1982) (invalidating Alaska stat-
ute which distributed state revenues on the basis of length of residency); Memo-
rial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 279 (1974) (striking down Arizona
statute that required one year residency to receive nonemergency medical care);
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 356 (1972) (invalidating state law that required
a voter to be a resident of the state for one year before voting); Shapiro v. Thomp-
son, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969) (invalidating state and District of Columbia statutes
which denied welfare benefits to persons who had not resided within the jurisdic-
tion for at least one year); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 760 (1966) (up-
holding application of the criminal conspiracy sanctions of the Civil Rights Acts to
private individuals who attempted to deprive black persons of the right to enjoy
public facilities connected with interstate travel); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S.
160, 172 (1941) (invalidating a statute which penalized the bringing into the state
of any nonresident person by anyone knowing the individual to be an indigent
person); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 49 (1867) (invalidating a statute
which imposed a tax on railroads for every passenger carried out of the state).
124 Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 629; see Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 492
(1849).
For all the great purposes for which the Federal government was
formed, we are one people, with one common country. We are all
citizens of the United States; and, as members of the same commu-
nity, must have the right to pass and repass through every part of it
without interruption, as freely as in our own States.
Id.
125 Zobel, 457 U.S. at 60 n.6. "The right to travel and to move from one state to
another has long been accepted, yet both the nature and the source of that right
have remained obscure." Id.
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distinct sources: the equal protection clause, 26 the due
process clauses, 27 the privileges and immunities clause of
article IV,128 the privileges or immunities clause of the
fourteenth amendment, 2 9 the commerce clause,13 0 and
the "penumbra" of the first amendment.' 3 l In some re-
cent cases, the Supreme Court has found little need to tie
the right to travel to a particular textual source. 32 For
example, Justice Brennan, announcing the judgment of
the Court in Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopez,' 33
wrote that "in light of the unquestioned historic accept-
ance of the principle of free interstate migration, and of
the important role that principle has played in transform-
ing many States into a single Nation, we have not felt im-
pelled to locate this right definitively in any particular
constitutional provision. ' 34 This approach, however, is
hardly an example of responsible judicial review. The
Court should not, on one hand, declare that the Constitu-
tion recognizes a fundamental right to travel, but, on the
other, fail to link that right to any particular provision.
12c Hooper, 472 U.S. at 618; Memorial Hosp., 415 U.S. at 252; Dunn, 405 U.S. at
342; Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 632. In recent years, the Supreme Court has couched
most right to travel cases in equal protection terms. See, e.g., Zobel, 457 U.S. at 60
n.6. "In reality, right to travel analysis refers to little more than a particular appli-
cation of equal protection analyis." Id.
127 Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 671 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1,
14 (1965).
,28 E.g., Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 920 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Ward v. Mary-
land, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 430 (1871); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168,
180 (1869).
129 Edwards, 314 U.S. at 178 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 183 (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
1- Id. at 172; CrandaU, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 49 (Clifford, J., concurring); cf Guest,
383 U.S. at 767.
', Cf., e.g., Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964). "[F]reedom of
travel is . . .closely related to rights of free speech and association . I..." ld. at
517. "Travel abroad [or] within the country... may be as close to the heart of the
individual as the choice of what he eats, or wears, or reads. Freedom of move-
ment is basic in our scheme of values." Id. at 505-06 (quoting Kent v. Dulles, 357
U.S. 116, 125-26 (1958)).
,32 See Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 898; Guest, 383 U.S. at 759. "Although there have
been recurring differences in emphasis within the Court as to the source ... [a]ll
have argued that the right exists." Id.
33 476 U.S. at 898.
134 Id. at 902.
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Such an approach all too conveniently frees the Court
from the constraints of the text or the precedents which
have interpreted the text and too often results in unprin-
cipled decisions. 35
Instead, the proper approach is to identify a specific
textual source for the right to travel, and then inquire
whether the statute in question violates the recognized
standards of that textual source.' 36 The critical question
at hand, then, is which textual sources may give rise to a
claim that a federal statute violates the fundamental right
to travel. Several of the historic sources-the commerce
clause and the privileges and/or immunities clauses-are
generally considered limitations on state and not federal
action, 137 and have not, in recent years, been relied on as
sources of the right to travel.'13 Furthermore, the "pen-
1-5 See generally Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399, 420-31 (1985).
Schauer contends that language (either from the constitutional text or from a rule
in a case or series of cases) can be a significant constraint on constitutional
interpretation.
If we consider the text to be informative about boundaries, or limits,
rather than about centers, or cores, then the text appears far less
irrelevant than is commonly assumed. The text presumptively con-
strains us, or should, from overstepping what are admittedly prethe-
oretical and almost intuitive linguistic bounds, and thus serves as
one constraint on constitutional interpretation.
... An interpretation is legitimate (which is not the same as cor-
rect) only insofar as it purports to interpret some language of the
document, and only insofar as the interpretation is within the
boundaries at least suggested by that language.
Id. at 431.
- See Comment, A Strict Scrutiny of the Right to Travel, 22 UCLA L. REV. 1129,
1142-43 (1975). For a good example of this approach, see Zobel, 457 U.S. at 74-78
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
137 Comment, supra note 136, at 1143 n.76; see J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.
YOUNG, supra note 113, § 10.3, at 318-20 (discussing applications of the privileges
and/or immunities clauses); supra notes 113-114 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing futility of commerce clause challenge). But cf. Kurland, The Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause: "Its Hour Come Round at Last"? 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 405, 416-19 (arguing
that the fourteenth amendment's privileges or immunities clause applies to the
federal government).
,38 See Comment, supra note 136, at 1140-42. But see Zobel, 457 U.S. at 74-78
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor argues that the privileges and im-
munities clause of article IV is the proper source of the right to travel and, there-
fore, provides the standards by which statutes infringing on the right to travel
must be judged. Id. The challenged statute in Zobel, however, was a state, not a
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umbral" theory of the first amendment has been explicitly
rejected as a source of the right to travel.' 39 Two sources
of the right, however, do provide ammunition against a
federal statute: the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment and the equal protection clause.
All government action against individuals must satisfy
both the substantive due process requirements and the
equal protection requirements of the fourteenth amend-
ment. 40 The due process limitation on federal actions is
found in the fifth amendment. 14  By its own terms, the
fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause applies
only to state actions.142 An implied equal protection guar-
antee, however, has been found in the due process clause
of the fifth amendment.1 43
The methods of analysis for the due process and equal
protection limitations are different. 4 4 The doctrine of
substantive due process insists that the government justify
any interference with an individual interest.' 45 The equal
federal, statute. Thus, even if O'Connor's opinion prevailed, Zobel would not
stand for the proposition that the privileges and immunities clause applies to fed-
eral statutes impinging on the right to interstate travel.
,39 Zemel, 381 U.S. at 16; see also Comment, supra note 136, at 1141.
140 McCoy, Recent Equal Protection Decisions-Fundamental Right to Travel or "New-
comers" as a Suspect Class?, 28 VAND. L. REV. 987, 988 (1975).
1' U.S. CONST. amend. V. The pertinent part of the fifth amendment reads as
follows: "[No person] shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, nor shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law .. " Id. See generallyJ. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &J. YOUNG, supra note
113, § 13.1, at 451-52.
42 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. The pertinent part of the fourteenth amend-
ment reads as follows:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
state deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due pro-
cess of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.
Id. (emphasis added).
"4 See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Bolling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497 (1954). "Thus, if a classification would be invalid under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is also inconsistent with the
due process requirement of the Fifth Amendment." Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S.
361, 364-65 n.4 (1974).
144 J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &J. YOUNG, supra note 113, § 14.1, at 524.
" Id. at 524-25.
protection guarantee, on the other hand, concerns the
equal treatment of individuals by the government. Specif-
ically, the doctrine of equal protection prohibits the une-
qual treatment of different classes of persons by state
action without adequate justification for that inequality. 46
a. Substantive Due Process Analysis
Under the substantive due process analysis, when a stat-
ute regulates an individual interest that may be character-
ized as "fundamental," the regulation must be the least
restrictive method available for the effectuation of an ex-
tremely important or "compelling" state interest.147  Be-
cause the right to travel has been recognized as
fundamental, 48 any legislation that impinges on that right
is subject to this high level of judicial scrutiny. When ap-
plied to the Wright Amendment, the substantive due pro-
cess test raises three issues: (1) whether the Wright
Amendment infringes on the right to travel, (2) whether
the Amendment promotes a compelling state interest, and
(3) whether the Wright Amendment is the least restrictive
method for promoting that compelling interest.
Under the substantive due process test, a colorable ar-
gument can be made that the Wright Amendment is un-
constitutional. This argument rests on two conclusions.
First, it seems clear that the Amendment does infringe on
the fundamental right to interstate travel. The Wright
Amendment makes travel from Dallas to states outside the
146 See generally McCoy, supra note 140, at 988.
,41 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973); see also McCoy, supra note
140, at 989. Determining which rights may properly be characterized as "funda-
mental" is difficult. "All that can be said with certainty is that the justices have
selected a group of individual rights which do not have a specific textual basis in
the Constitution or its amendments and deemed them to be 'fundamental.' " J.
NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 113, § 11.7 at 369. The Supreme
Court has found six rights that are fundamental and, thus, worthy of strict scru-
tiny: (1) freedom of association, (2) right to vote and to participate in the electoral
process, (3) right to fairness in the criminal process, (4) right to fairness in proce-
dures governing individual claims against governmental deprivations of life, lib-
erty, or property, (5) right to privacy, and (6) right to interstate travel. Id. at 370-
71.
148 Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 618.
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Love Field Service Area1 49 less convenient and more
costly. Passengers whose flights originate at Love Field
must endure certain inconveniences in order to cross in-
terstate borders implicated by the statute. These inconve-
niences include (1) the inability to obtain certain
information necessary to facilitate passage across the im-
plicated borders due to the advertising ban imposed by
the statute,' 50 (2) the double ticketing procedure that re-
quires passengers to claim and recheck their baggage,
which imposes at least a forty-five minute waiting period
between flights,' 5 1 and (3) the prohibition on customarily
lower-priced "through fares."' 152 The right to interstate
travel is offended by these inconveniences because they
are imposed only when a passenger attempts to cross
specified interstate borders.
After establishing that the right to interstate travel is in-
fringed upon by the Wright Amendment, the second con-
clusion necessary to find that this interference is violative
of the fifth amendment substantive due process right is
that either (1) the Wright Amendment serves a govern-
ment purpose which, although legitimate, fails to rise to
the level of "compelling" or extremely important, or (2)
the means chosen are not the least restrictive method by
which to promote that interest. The interest served by the
Wright Amendment has traditionally been identified as
the economic protection of DFW.'I' The government, no
,49 The Love Field Service Area includes the states of Texas, Louisiana, Arkan-
sas, New Mexico, and Oklahoma. For a discussion of the Wright Amendment, see
supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
1-o DOT Order, supra note 3, at 12.
'-, Id. at 10-11. The waiting period necessarily results because the Wright
Amendment requires that bags be claimed and re-checked before a passenger may
board a "connecting" flight. Id.; see supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
1-52 DOT Order, supra note 3, at 12. The DOT has forbidden airlines from cre-
ating a fare which "could be sold and constructed for service from Love Field to a
point outside the restricted service area that is different from the sum of the local
fares (Love Field and to a point in the authorized area, plus that point to a point
outside the service fare[ j)." Id. The DOT considers any such arrangement a
through fare, which is prohibited by the Wright Amendment. Id.; see supra note 60
and accompanying text.
1-1 See Continental Air Lines v. Department of Transp., 843 F.2d 1444, 1446
doubt, would argue that the Wright Amendment serves
other interests, such as reduction of noise pollution." 4 A
court must decide whether any of these interests are so
compelling that they justify the restriction of constitu-
tional rights.
Regardless of whether the interest served by the Wright
Amendment is compelling, however, the means chosen
are clearly not the least restrictive method of achieving
that interest. Indeed, several alternatives to the Wright
Amendment are less restrictive on the right to interstate
travel and still serve the purpose likely advanced by the
government. For instance, a perimeter rule like the ones
at National and LaGuardia airports could be employed.155
The perimeter rules at National and LaGuardia protect
larger neighboring airports, yet do not utilize state
boundaries as the lines of demarcation. Additionally,
those perimeter rules impose substantially less inconven-
ience on the passenger because passengers are not forced
to claim and recheck their luggage between flights.' 56
Also, passengers need not purchase two separate tickets
in order to reach their destination. The Wright Amend-
ment, then, is clearly not the least restrictive method for
protecting DFW (assuming DFW still needs protection, an
issue discussed in Section IV).
The Wright Amendment is also not the least restrictive
method of reducing noise pollution. Changes in noise
(D.C. Cir. 1988) ("The reason for the exception was, of course, to protect DFW
from competition at Love Field."); Henigson, House Limits Love Flights to 4 States,
Dallas Times Herald, Jan. 31, 1980, at A1, col 6.
'- Since the imposition of the Wright Amendment in 1979, residents living
near Love Field have come to appreciate the restrictions on flights. Although
noise control is incidental to the Amendment's main purpose (protection of
DFW), it is increasingly cited as a reason for maintaining the Wright Amendment.
See, e.g., Bryant, Wright Amendment Helps Keep Inner City Livable, Dallas Morning
News, Oct. 7, 1989, at 31A, col. 1. For further discussion of the wisdom of main-
taining the Wright Amendment for noise control purposes, see infra notes 294-
3.13 and accompanying text.
1-15 For a discussion of the perimeter rules at National and LaGuardia Airports,
see supra notes 68-106 and accompanying text.
15 For a discussion of these perimeter rules, see supra notes 68-73 (National
Airport), 93-96 (LaGuardia Airport) and accompanying text.
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levels are determined more by changes in the aggregate
number of operations performed at an airport than by the
origins and destinations of additional flights. 157 A flight
to Nashville is generally no more noisy than a flight to
New Orleans. Alternatives to the Wright Amendment
might involve restrictions more rationally related to the
reduction of noise pollution, including, perhaps, a curfew
on the hours of operation or a limitation on the total op-
erations at Love Field.' 58 Because it is not the least re-
strictive method of promoting the state interest and
because it infringes on the passenger's fundamental right
to interstate travel, one can argue that the Wright Amend-
ment is unconstitutional under the fifth amendment due
process clause.
b. Equal Protection
The Wright Amendment also potentially violates the
equal protection guarantee implied by the fifth amend-
ment. As noted above, the doctrine of equal protection
prohibits unequal treatment of different classes of per-
sons by government action without adequate justification
for that inequality.' 59
Traditionally, the Supreme Court has spoken of two dif-
ferent standards for determining whether unequal treat-
ment of individuals is justified.' ° The lower standard,
157 See Testimony of Thomas B. Carter, Regional Director, Dallas Regional Of-
ice, Federal Trade Commission, before the Transportation Committee, City
Council, City of Dallas, Texas 12 (Sept. 5, 1989) [hereinafter Testimony of Carter]
(available on file at the Journal of Air Law and Commerce).
- These types of less restrictive measures were suggested by the Dallas City
Council in their resolution of September 27, 1989, calling for repeal of the Wright
Amendment. For a further discussion of this resolution, see infra notes 325-326
and accompanying text.
,59 See supra text accompanying note 146.
,-0 See McCoy, supra note 140, at 990-91. Although the Supreme Court has yet
to abandon the "two-tiered" approach, most commentators agree that a third,
intermediate standard of review now exists. See, e.g., J. NOwAK, R. ROTUNDA &J.
YOUNG, supra note 113, § 14.3, at 531-33. The intermediate standard, applied
most notably in cases involving gender-based classifications, is more probing than
the "rational basis" standard, but less rigid than classical "strict scrutiny." Id. See
generally Gunther, Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine or a Changing Court: A Model
called the "rational basis" standard, requires merely that
any inequality in the treatment of individuals by the state
be rationally related to the effectuation of a legitimate
state interest. 16' In two types of situations the Court has
applied a higher standard, known as the "strict scrutiny"
standard.' 62  Under the strict scrutiny standard, an ine-
quality may be justified only by a showing that it is abso-
lutely necessary to effectuate a "compelling interest" of
the state. 163 This standard has been imposed whenever
the class of persons disadvantaged by the unequal treat-
ment is a "suspect class" (i.e., a politically powerless or
unpopular minority) or when the unequal treatment has
an impact on a "fundamental right."' 4
The court's determination of standard of review is usu-
ally outcome determinative. History shows that when a
rational basis standard is applied the statute is usually up-
held; but when a strict scrutiny standard is applied, courts
almost always invalidate the statute. 165
Several Supreme Court decisions have applied the strict
scrutiny standard in cases involving the fundamental right
to interstate travel. 166 The landmark case applying this
standard was Shapiro v. Thompson.' 67 Shapiro involved a
District of Columbia statute, passed by Congress, and two
state statutes that denied welfare benefits to persons who
had not resided within the jurisdiction for at least one
for New Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972). The test for intermediate level
of review is generally stated as follows: the means chosen by the legislature (i.e.
the classification) must serve important governmental objectives and must be sub-
stantially related to achievement of these objectives. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190 (1976). Some commentators argue that an intermediate standard is
creeping into right to travel cases. See, e.g., J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG,
supra note 113, § 14.3, at 533. For futher discussion of this view, see infra notes
173-188 and accompanying text.
161 See Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
,M' J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &J. YOUNG, supra note 113, § 14.3, at 531.
163 See Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 903-04; Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 639. See generally, J.
NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &J. YOUNG, supra note 113, § 14.3, at 530.
1-J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, &J. YOUNG, supra note 113, § 14.3, at 530-31.
,65 See Gunther, supra note 160, at 8.
See Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 898; Memorial Hosp., 415 U.S. at 250; Shapiro, 394
U.S. at 618.
167 394 U.S. at 618.
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year. 68 The majority opinion found that the residency re-
quirements deterred the entry of indigent persons into
these jurisdictions, thus limiting their right to engage in
interstate travel.' 69 The court held that, because the right
to engage in interstate travel is a fundamental constitu-
tional right, the classification distinguishing old residents
from new ones had to be invalidated unless it was "shown
to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental in-
terest."'7 ° The Court found none of the purposes as-
serted by the government sufficient to satisfy the
compelling interest test.' 7 ' Since Shapiro, the Court has
continued to invoke the strict scrutiny standard in right to
interstate travel cases. 72
Some commentators argue that not all laws which re-
strict interstate mobility need be subject to close judicial
scrutiny. 7 3 They assert that the strict scrutiny standard
should apply only when the statute in question is a direct
barrier to interstate movement or when governmental
benefits are allocated on the basis of length of residence
in the state. 74 When the statute serves reasonable state
interests unrelated to deterring travel, however, a lower
standard should apply. 75
Indeed, in several recent interstate travel cases, the
Supreme Court has appeared reluctant to embrace the
strict scrutiny standard. In Zobel v. Williams,' 76 the court
avoided defining the appropriate standard of review for
state actions impeding the right to travel. 77 In Zobel, the
1- Id. at 622-28.
169 Id. at 634.
t70 Id.
17 Id. at 648-42. The states argued that the residency requirement served sev-
eral purposes, including: (1) preservation of the financial integrity of the state
welfare program by preventing an influx of indigent newcomers, (2) providing an
objective test of residency, and (3) discouraging fraudulent collection of payments
from more than one state. Id.
,72 See Memorial Hosp., 415 U.S. at 250; Dunn, 405 U.S. at 330.
173 J. NOWAX, R. ROTUNDA, &J. YOUNG, supra note 113, § 14.38, at 771.
174 Id.
17.i Id.
1i 457 U.S. at 55.
177 Id. at 60-65.
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Court struck down an Alaska statute that distributed state
money to residents based on the length of their residency
in the state. Chief Justice Burger wrote that "if the statu-
tory scheme could not pass even the [minimum rational-
ity] test proposed by the state, we need not decide
whether any enhanced scrutiny is called for."'' 78 This
same approach was later adopted in Hooper v. Bernalillo
County Assessor.' 79 There the Court held that it need not
address the proper standard of review in right to travel
cases because "if the statutory scheme cannot even pass
the minimum rationality test, our inquiry ends."' 80 Simi-
larly, there was not a majority of the Court in favor of any
particular standard of review in Attorney General of New York
v. Soto-Lopez.'"' In this case, the Court struck down a New
York civil service employment preference for veterans
that applied only to those veterans who were New York
residents at the time they entered the military. The plu-
rality opinion embraced the strict scrutiny standard. 82
Chief Justice Burger, on the other hand, contended in his
concurrence that the Court need not address the standard
of review because the law could not withstand even the
most deferential level of scrutiny. 8 3 Justice White, in his
concurrence, concluded that the rational relationship
standards should apply because the right to travel was not
sufficiently implicated by the statute. 8 4
Despite the recent reluctance of the Court to frame its
analysis in "strict scrutiny" terms, any conclusion that the
Supreme Court is abandoning strict scrutiny review in
right to travel cases is premature. At most, these cases
merely stand for the proposition that when a statute fails
178 Id.
179 472 U.S. at 612.
o Id. at 618.
, 476 U.S. 898.
1 Id. at 906. "Of course, regardless of the label we place on our analysis-
right to migrate or equal protection-once we find a burden on the right to mi-
grate the standard of review is the same. Laws which burden that right must be
necessary to further a compelling state interest." Id. at 904-05 n.4.
183 Id. at 912 (Burger, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
I4 d. at 916 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
1990] 1043
1044 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [55
to satisfy even the lowest level of review, the Court will
not bother to inquire whether a higher standard applies.
There is also a conceptual flaw in basing the standard of
review on the extent of the infringement on a fundamen-
tal right. If the right to interstate travel truly is a funda-
mental right, the Court should analyze even a minor
impairment of this right under strict scrutiny review. As
Professor Tribe argues, "[a] $1 fine for choosing to be
critical of the government... would be as clearly suspect
as a $1,000 fine. It would indeed be an odd 'fundamental
right' whose exercise the government could penalize just
a bit without any special justification."'185
The weight of authority, in fact, indicates that strict
scrutiny remains the prevailing standard of review in right
to travel cases.' 86 The Supreme Court's latest right to
travel pronouncement is Soto-Lopez. i8 7 There the court ex-
plicitly embraced strict scrutiny review, stating that the
New York statute must be invalidated, "unless New York
can demonstrate that its classification is necessary to ac-
complish a compelling state interest."' l8 8
If the strict scrutiny test is applied, a court would likely
invalidate the Wright Amendment. 18 9 A strong argument
exists that the Wright Amendment establishes impermis-
sible classes based upon the exercise of the right to inter-
state travel. A passenger who flies from Love Field to
Oklahoma City is treated differently in Oklahoma City
,85 L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 16-8, at 1457 n.18 (2d ed.
1988).
'8 See Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 904-05 n.4. But see Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412
(1981) (interference with the right to leave state held to be sufficiently minimal
such that strict scrutiny was not triggered). The facts in Jones suggest that this case
has limited precedential value. In Jones, a Georgia statute made it a felony for a
parent to abandon a child in Georgia and then leave the state; it was only a misde-
meanor for him to abandon a child if he remained in the state. The court held the
statute to a lower standard of review because the defendant's own culpable con-
duct (abandoning his child) qualified his right to travel interstate; it was only this
lesser, qualified right which was being interfered with. Id. at 419.
187 476 U.S. at 898.
i8, Id. at 906.
189 As Professor Gunther has stated, strict scrutiny review is generally "strict" in
theory and "fatal" in fact. Gunther, supra note 160, at 8.
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than passengers who arrive from other cities or airports.
For instance, the passenger from Love Field may not util-
ize baggage transfer services when travelling to states be-
yond the Love Field Service Area. Nor may he remain on
board his flight from Love Field once it arrives in
Oklahoma City, if the flight continues on to states outside
the Love Field Service Area. Passengers who did not orig-
inate at Love Field are, of course, free to board that plane
wherever it may be going. Under a strict scrutiny test,
courts would strike down this classification unless it pro-
moted a "compelling" governmental interest. 0 °
Under a strict scrutiny approach, the government must
prove that the Wright Amendment promotes an ex-
tremely important or "compelling" government inter-
est.' 9' The interest traditionally recognized with respect
to the Wright Amendment has been the protection of
DFW. 192 Probably, the government would argue that the
Wright Amendment also serves other interests, such as
reduction of noise pollution. 93 To survive strict scrutiny
review, however, the government must prove more than
just the compelling nature of the interest served. The
Supreme Court has held that even where a compelling
governmental interest is shown to exist,' the government
must demonstrate that there are no alternative means to
achieve that interest which place less burden on the right
to travel.194 As shown above, there are several alternative
means of achieving the governmental interest served by
the Wright Amendment that are less intrusive on the right
to travel. 95 Those means might involve a more tradi-
tional and flexible perimeter rule, a curfew on the hours
of operation, or a limitation on total operations at Love
Field. Thus, if a court found that less intrusive means ex-
ist (or are available), it could conclude that the Wright
- See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
, See id.
"9 See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
'19 See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
I- Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 909-10; Dunn, 405 U.S. at 343.
195 See supra notes 155-158 and accompanying text.
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Amendment violates the equal protection guarantee even
though the Amendment serves a compelling state
interest.
2. The Port Preference Clause
In City of Houston v. FAA,196 the plaintiffs, through vari-
ous claims, maintained that the perimeter rule at National
Airport discriminated against cities not falling within the
1000 mile perimeter. The court downplayed the discrimi-
natory effect of the rule by noting: "No one has ever at-
tempted completely to bar travelers from distant cities
from flying to National Airport."' 19 7 This comment from
the court seems almost a veiled reference to the Wright
Amendment, as the prohibition on through ticketing and
advertising of double ticketing procedures is, arguably, an
attempt to completely bar travellers from cities outside
the Love Field service area from flying to Love Field.19 8
In light of these restrictions, the Wright Amendment's
discriminatory effect is significantly greater than that of
the perimeter rule at National Airport.
As in City of Houston, this discriminatory effect may be
attacked as a violation of the port preference clause. 199
Unfortunately, there is very little case authority interpret-
ing this clause. The existing authority, however, makes
clear that the discrimination must be between states and
not between particular ports within the same or different
states.200 Thus, one could not argue that Congress vio-
1- 679 F.2d at 1184; see supra notes 68-92 for a detailed analysis of the City of
Houston decision.
19 City of Houston, 679 F.2d at 1192.
" '8 For further discussion of the restrictions imposed on Love Field by the
Wright Amendment, see supra notes 32-65 and accompanying text.
'99 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 6. "No preference shall be given by any Regula-
tion of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another: nor
shall vessels bound to, or from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear or pay Duties
in another." Id.
200 Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421
(1856). This case involved a challenge to a federal statute which approved con-
struction of a bridge over the Ohio River near Wheeling, West Virginia. The
bridge allegedly blocked some paddle vessels from proceeding up the river to the
port of Pittsburgh. In rejecting Pennsylvania's claim that the statute discriminated
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lated the port preference clause by favoring DFW over
Love Field. Instead, a constitutional challenge to the
Wright Amendment based on the port preference clause
must focus on the discrimination suffered by states delib-
erately excluded from Love Field service.
Because case authority is so scarce and because a pe-
rimeter rule is at issue, City of Houston is the most relevant
source interpreting the port preference clause. Under the
Fifth Circuit's test, the Wright Amendment is not violative
of the port preference clause so long as the detriment suf-
fered by ports in states outside the Love Field Area occurs
"(i) as an incident to some otherwise legitimate govern-
ment act regulating commerce or (ii) more as a result of
the accident of geography than from an intentional gov-
ernmental preference.' '201
A good argument exists that the detriment suffered by
ports outside the Love Field service area is not an "acci-
dent of geography" as that term was defined by the Fifth
Circuit in City of Houston. There, the court held that Na-
tional Airport's perimeter rule was an accident of
geography.
The perimeter does not discriminate against a named state
or states. It does not declare that Texans may not fly non-
stop to National. Rather, it sets a limit of 1000 miles on
nonstop flights. Some states, e.g. Louisiana, straddle the
line. Some Louisiana airports meet this requirement,
others do not. Just as the Rocky Mountain states possess
beautiful scenery, Texas its reservoirs of oil and natural
gas, and California its sandy beaches, so the accident of
against the port of Pittsburgh in violation of the port preference clause, the Court
stated:
[Wihat is forbidden is, not discrimination between individual ports
within the same or different states, but discrimination between
states; and if so, in order to bring this case within the prohibition, it
is necessary to show, not merely discrimination between Pittsburgh
and Wheeling, but discrimination between the ports of Virginia and
those of Pennsylvania.
Id. at 435.
201 City of Houston, 679 F.2d at 1198. For a fuller discussion of the Fifth Circuit's
test in City of Houston, see supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
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geography places some states within 1000 miles of Na-
tional and others beyond.202
The Wright Amendment, however, does not utilize objec-
tive distance measurements as its line of demarcation, but
instead utilizes state borders. No state lies partially in and
partially out of the perimeter.2 °3 As a result, Albuquer-
que, New Mexico, 580 miles from Dallas, may serve Love
Field, while Wichita, Kansas, 333 miles away, may not.
Particular states, because they are not named specifically
by the statute, may not serve Love Field. The Wright
Amendment deliberately favors the ports of New Mexico,
Oklahoma, Arkansas, and Louisiana at the expense of
ports in other states.
The more difficult argument is showing-that the detri-
ment suffered by these ports is the sole purpose and effect
of the statute, and not simply an incident to a legitimate
government act regulating commerce under the statute.
Whether the Wright Amendment violates this prong of
the City of Houston port preference test depends largely on
how "incidental" is defined.
On one hand, one could argue that the clear purpose of
the Wright Amendment is to promote DFW, not to dis-
criminate against unnamed states.20 4 Since protecting
DFW clearly falls within Congress's authority to regulate
commerce,2 0 5 and since discrimination against states
outside the Love Field Service Area is not the statute's
202 City of Houston, 679 F.2d at 1198.
203 For a more detailed discussion of the particular provisions of the Wright
Amendment, see supra notes 32-65 and accompanying text.
20 ContinentalAir Lines, 843 F.2d at 1446. "The Amendment was a compromise
solution to a longstanding controversy involving attempts by the cities of Dallas
and Fort Worth to prohibit interstate operations at Love Field and other area
airports so as to ensure the viability of new Dallas/Ft. Worth Regional Airport."
Id. (quoting DOT's brief).
205 Under modern commerce clause interpretation, a court will uphold com-
merce based regulations if there is any rational basis upon which Congress could
have found some relation between the regulation and interstate commerce. J. No-
WAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 113, § 4.8, at 148; see, e.g., Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
main purpose, the Wright Amendment satisfies the City of
Houston port preference test.
On the other hand, "incidental" is often defined as
something happening merely as a chance or undesigned
feature of something else.2 °6 In the case of the Wright
Amendment, the sole mechanism by which the statute
seeks to effect its purpose is by discriminating against
named states. Therefore, the discrimination suffered by
states outside the Love Field Service Area is not merely
incidental to the purpose of protecting DFW. Under this
view, the Wright Amendment violates the first prong of
the port preference test as enunciated by the Fifth Circuit
in City of Houston. If this view is accepted, the Wright
Amendment probably violates the port preference clause
of the United States Constitution.
V. SHOULD THE WRIGHT AMENDMENT BE REPEALED?
As demonstrated above, serious constitutionality ques-
tions are raised by the Wright Amendment. Even if a
court should find that the Amendment is constitutional,
however, Congress should reevaluate the Wright Amend-
ment in light of the current commercial air service needs
of the Dallas-Fort Worth area. It is essentially the thesis
of this Comment that the Wright Amendment no longer
serves those needs and that new restrictions, which are
more rationally related to current needs, should be imple-
mented. Repeal of the Wright Amendment would remove
two critical restrictions on Love Field: (1) the restriction
that flights can only be operated to points within Texas,
Louisiana, Arkansas, New Mexico, and Oklahoma, and (2)
the restriction that air service cannot be extended beyond
this area by means of through service, connecting service,
or interline service.
This section will demonstrate that first, the Wright
20- See, e.g., Spurr v. Acme Steel Co., 238 F. Supp. 606 (N.D. Ill. 1964). " 'Inci-
dental' is generally defined as follows: [B]eing likely to ensue as a chance or minor
consequence .... " Id. at 607 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY (1963)).
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Amendment should be repealed because it has achieved
the goals for which it was intended; second, repeal would
bring substantial benefits to consumers of air carrier serv-
ices in the Dallas-Fort Worth area; and third, substantial
economic benefits would accrue to the surrounding area if
the restrictions at Love Field are lifted.
A. The Purpose Behind the Wright Amendment Has Been
Served
The Wright Amendment was designed to protect newly
built DFW, as many feared that unrestricted air travel out
of Love Field would endanger the success of the new air-
port.2 °7 DFW, however, no longer needs this protection,
and thus, the Wright Amendment has outlived its
purpose.
Since opening fifteen years ago, DFW has grown and
prospered, now ranking as the second busiest airport in
the world. °8 Officials no longer concern themselves with
how to attract traffic to DFW; instead they focus on how to
alleviate the strains caused by overcrowding. 20 9 In fact, a
broad range of indicia demonstrate that DFW is firmly en-
trenched and is now suffering not from underuse, but
overuse. For instance, both American Airlines and Delta,
which operate major hubs at DFW, have gate space
shortages. 210 Also, flight delays due to airport volume are
a growing problem at DFW.21 ' From March through July
207 Continental Air Lines v. Department of Transp., 843 F.2d 1444, 1446 (D.C.
Cir. 1988); see Henigson, supra note 153.
208 Zimmerman & Stahl, $3.5 Billion D/FW Expansion Outlined, Dallas Morning
News, Sept. 26, 1989, at Al, col. 1.
209 See Reed, The Man Who Runs the Place Talks About Its Growth, Ft. Worth Star-
Telegram,Jan. 15, 1989, § 2, at 1, col. 1 (interview with Oris Dunham, Executive
Director of the DFW Airport Board).
2 0 Both American and Delta have stated that they intend to build additional
gates. Tedesco, Opportunity Can Land Here, Dallas Morning News, Aug. 7, 1989, at
A9, col. 2; Zimmerman, Delta Studying DFW Expansion, Dallas Morning News, Aug.
3, 1989, at Dl, col. 2.
211 See generally Testimony of Carter, supra note 157. Carter's testimony related
to a study done by the Dallas Regional Office of the FTC which studied the effects
on consumers, both inside and outside the Dallas area, which may result from
removal of the flight restrictions at Love Field. Id. at 2.
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1989, DFW experienced over 5300 delays, approximately
18% of which were attributed to airport volume.21 2 In
fact, flight delays at DFW rose 38% in 1989.213. Another
problem at DFW is parking, which is increasingly difficult
to obtain near the terminal.21 4
Currently, the airport's operations are increasing at a
rate of 5% per year.21 5 In 1988, 675,000 flights arrived at
or departed from DFW. 1 6 To meet some of the demands
being made on DFW, the Airport Board has unveiled an
elaborate $3.5 billion expansion plan, involving the con-
struction of a new terminal and two additional runways.2 17
Under this plan, passenger boardings would double to
around fifty-three million annually and aircraft landings
and takeoffs would double to 1.2 million.218 Even if these
plans are implemented, however, it is estimated that DFW
will reach its capacity sometime around the year 2020.219
It is clear, then, that DFW's long-term viability has been
established. Even if the Wright Amendment contributed
212 Id. at 19. (quoting FAA Daily Aircraft Operations, DFW and DAL, Jan.-July
1989).
213 Nather, Flight Delay Time Up 387 at D/FW, Airport Voices Need for Expansion,
Dallas Morning News, Feb. 7, 1990, at A21, col. 4. Although officials at American
Airlines and Delta Air Lines attributed the increased delays to weather, Oris Dun-
ham, DFW's executive director, attributed the delays to growing congestion at
DFW. Id. Dunham also noted that the FAA considers DFW one of the 21 major
airports that is "seriously congested." Id.
214 Testimony of Carter, supra note 157, at 8.
215 Id.
2 ,, FAA, ADMINISTRATOR'S FACT BOOK (Oct. 1989) (FAA Publication).
217 Zimmerman & Stahl, supra note 208. Under the plan, passenger boarding
gates at DFW would double from the current 100 to 200. Id.
218 Id.
219 KPMG PEAT MARWICK, SATELLITE AIRPORT DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM (Oct.
1989) (prepared for the North Central Texas Council of Governments) (available
on file at the Journal of Air Law and Commerce). This study was commissioned to
determine the potential need for an additional airport in the Dallas-Fort Worth
area to relieve congestion at DFW and Love Field. Id. The study determined that,
with the existing airfield, demand would exceed capacity at DFW by the year 2000.
Id. With two new runways, the study predicted, DFW would reach capacity by
2020. Id. Love Field is also predicted to reach capacity. The study predicted that
Love Field would reach capacity by the year 2000 with the existing airfield at DFW
and by 2020 with two new runways at DFW. Id. The study's final conclusion was
that, with the existing airfield at DFW, a new satellite airport would be required by
the year 2000, and by 2020 with two new runways at DFW. Id.
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to the eventual success of DFW, it is clear that DFW no
longer needs the Amendment's help. Oris Dunham, the
Director of the DFW Airport Board concluded that "the
second-largest airport in the world isn't going to bejeop-
ardized to any great extent" by repeal of the Wright
Amendment. 220 To the contrary, he stated that repealing
the Amendment could help reduce airfield congestion at
DFW and might allow DFW to delay some of its capital
improvements. 22' Mr. Dunham estimated that repeal of
the Wright Amendment would only extend by two years
the date when DFW reaches its capacity.222
The extent to which DFW is insulated from harm result-
ing from potential future growth of services at Love Field
is well-evidenced by a recent study commissioned by the
DFW Airport Board.223 Conducted by KPMG Peat
Marwick, the study first calculated that, if the Wright
Amendment remained in place, the number of passengers
enplaned at DFW would increase from 21.3 million in
1988 to 40.0 million in the year 2000, a gain of 87.7%.224
Next, the study determined the amount of growth that
would occur at DFW if the Wright Amendment was re-
pealed and replaced by a 650 mile Love Field perimeter
rule that allowed connecting service to points outside the
perimeter. 25 Under this less restrictive scenario, the
number of passengers enplaned at DFW would still in-
crease by 84.5%, from 21.3 million in 1988 to 39.3 mil-
lion in the year 2000.226 These statistics show that the
220 Zimmerman, Airlines Plotting Love Plans, Dallas Morning News, Aug. 17, 1989,
at DI, col. 4.
221 Id.
222 Testimony of Carter, supra note 157, at 8-9 (quoting Oris Dunham, DFW
Executive Director, before the Transporation Committee, City Council, City of
Dallas, Tex. Public Hearing, (Aug. 15, 1989)).
223 KPMG PEAT MARWICK, EVALUATION OF THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF CHANGING
THE AIR SERVICE RESTRICTIONS AT LOVE FIELD (WRIGHT AMENDMENT STUDY) (Mar.
1990) (prepared for DFW International Airport Board) (available on file at the
Journal of Air Law & Commerce).
224 Id. at 44.
225 Id.
226 Id. This conclusion was based on the assumption that only carriers currently
not serving DFW could move to Love Field, because airlines currently serving
1990] COMMENTS 1053
restrictions on Love Field could be substantially loosened
without causing significant harm to DFW.227
While DFW is suffering from overcrowding, Love Field,
fifteen miles away, has excess capacity. Love Field's esti-
mated capacity is approximately 450,000 operations per
year.228 Yet, in 1988, Love Field had only 212,823 opera-
tions.22 9 Of these, only 106,534 were commercial opera-
tions.23 ° In 1973, eight major airlines operated out of
Love Field, making it the eighth busiest airport in the
United States. 2-1  Today, Southwest is the only major
commercial airline serving Love Field.232 Prior to the
opening of DFW, fifty-five gates and three concourses
were utilized at Love Field.2 33  At present, only fifteen
gates and one concourse are in use.23 4 Furthermore, the
DFW would remain bound by the 1968 Regional Airport Concurrent Board Ordi-
nance, which required all airlines then serving Love Field to move all of their
services to DFW. Id. at ES-3. Even if the DFW Airport Board granted a waiver of
this requirement, the study estimated, the total number of passengers enplaned at
DFW would increase to 39.0 million by the year 2000, a gain of 83.0%. Id. at 44.
27 The study did indicate that DFW's growth could be significantly impacted if
the Wright Amendment was repealed and Love Field was left completely un-
restricted. Based on this scenario, the study estimated that enplanements at DFW
would only increase from 21.3 million in 1988 to 33.3 million in the year 2000. Id.
at 44. The importance of statistics based on this scenario, however, should not be
overestimated. Although they suggest that some reasonable restrictions are
needed at Love Field, they should not be construed to mean that the Wright
Amendment should be maintained in its entirety. Because of noise and conges-
tion considerations, it is generally recognized that reasonable restrictions will al-
ways be needed at Love Field. See infta notes 294-302 and accompanying text.
Therefore, statistics based on a scenario of unrestricted growth at Love Field are
largely irrelevant and unrealistic.
228 HARRIS MILLER MILLER & HANSON INC., ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL NOISE EF-
FECTS AS A RESULT OF REPEAL OF THE WRIGHT AMENDMENT 3 (Aug. 10, 1989) (re-
port prepared for City of Dallas Department of Aviation); see also Testimony of
Carter, supra note 157, at 9 (quoting Oris Dunham, who estimates the capacity of
Love Field to be 435,000 operations).
229 Dallas Love Field Activity Report, Dallas Love Field Circular (available on
file at the Journal of Air Law and Commerce).
230 Id.
231 Zimmerman, supra note 34.
222 Id.
23 Testimony of Carter, supra note 157, at 9.
23. Id. At least nine additional elevated gates are currently available at Love
Field for immediate use. Other gates have been converted for other uses since the
opening of DFW. These gates may be reconverted, however, subject to various
existing leases. Id. at 9 n.24.
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city estimates that even during peak periods approxi-
mately 40% of the airport's garage and surface lot is un-
used.235 It was perhaps with these facts in mind that the
Southern Methodist University Business School's Center
for Enterprising, in urging that the Wright Amendment
be repealed, concluded that "Love Field is an underutil-
ized and wasting economic development asset. 236
One of the major obstacles to repealing the Wright
Amendment is the persistent opposition of Fort Worth of-
ficials to any modification in the 1979 law.237 Fort Worth
officials have steadfastly opposed any expansion of Love
Field because of fear that their investment in DFW will
somehow diminish if Love Field competes with DFW.238
21 Id. at 9-10. Recently the City of Dallas spent $21.5 million renovating the
terminal and creating additional parking space at Love Field. Dillon, The New Look
of Love, Dallas Morning News, Feb. 4, 1988, at C1, col. 1. Furthermore, additional
spaces are available where parking facilities have been located in the past. Testi-
mony of Carter, supra note 157, at 10 n.27.
236 SMU - Edwin L. Cox School of Business, Center for Enterprising, News Re-
lease, at 4 (May 15, 1987). The Center for Enterprising's conclusions regarding
Love Field were part of a detailed report by Harold T. Gross and Bernard L.
Weinstein examining development strategies for the Dallas area. In their report,
Gross and Weinstein concluded that Dallas should concentrate on improving its
business climate and infrastructure in order to promote industrial retention and
expansion. To that end, they suggested a series of initiatives that Dallas' public
and private sectors should undertake. Two of those initiatives were further devel-
opment of Love Field and repeal of the Wright Amendment. "The Wright
Amendment, which is intended to protect DFW International Airport by restrict-
ing interstate air access to Love Field, is an increasingly costly anachronism. Dal-
las needs two air hubs and should work for repeal of the Wright Amendment." Id.
at 7.
2 7 See Brumley, FW Council Opposes Repeal of Wright Law, Dallas Morning News,
Oct. 13, 1989, at A28, col. 5; F. W to Fight Wright Law Changes, Dallas Times Her-
ald, Oct. 13, 1989, at A25, col. 3.
2-118 Brumley, supra note 237. Fort Worth officials have publicly threatened to
sue the City of Dallas if Dallas continues to work toward repeal of the Wright
Amendment. The legal basis of such a suit apparently rests in the 1968 Regional
Airport Concurrent Bond Ordinance which created DFW. In that Ordinance, the
two cities agreed to "promote the optimum development of the lands and Facili-
ties comprising [DFW] at the earliest practicable date" and not to take "any ac-
tion, implement any policy, or enter into any agreement or contract which by its
or their nature would be competitive with or in opposition to the optimum devel-
opment of [DFW]." Bond Ordinance, supra note 11, § 9.5. In this regard, Fort
Worth seems to interpret "optimal development" as meaning "maximum number
of flights and passengers." Dallas, on the other hand, could argue that "optimal
development" means "efficient allocation of resources." When incoming and
Interestingly, they pursue this line of attack while enthusi-
astically supporting construction of a new airport, Alli-
ance Airport, in Fort Worth. 3 9
The foregoing analysis makes clear that repeal of the
Wright Amendment would only have a minor impact (and
one that is, arguably, positive) on DFW, the success of
which is a foregone conclusion. Furthermore, the follow-
ing analysis demonstrates that repeal of the Wright
Amendment would have substantial positive effects for all
consumers of airline services throughout the Dallas-Fort
Worth area. In considering repeal of the Wright Amend-
ment, lawmakers should consider the net effect that repeal
would have on the Dallas-Fort Worth area. This may in-
volve a balancing test in which lawmakers must balance
the number of people benefited by repeal, and the degree
to which they benefit, against the number of people who
suffer from repeal, and the extent of their injury. The fol-
lowing discussion makes clear that repealing the Wright
Amendment will have a pronounced positive impact on
the quality of air services offered to travellers to and from
the Dallas-Fort Worth area-a positive impact that far
outweighs any corresponding harm.
B. Benefits to Consumers from Repeal of the Wright Amendment
1. Lower Air Fares
On September 5, 1989, Thomas B. Carter, the Director
of the Dallas Regional Office of the Federal Trade Com-
mission, presented to the Transportation Committee of
the Dallas City Council an analysis of the effects on con-
sumers, both inside and outside the Dallas area, that may
result from removal of the flight restrictions on Love
outgoing passengers suffer delays, it is highly questionable whether DFW is being
"optimally developed." Fort Worth's position on this matter is interesting be-
cause Fort Worth is currently constructing a new airport, Alliance Airport, which
is expected, and already has begun, to compete with DFW for industrial and cargo
business. See infra notes 319-324 for a discussion of Alliance Airport.
239 For a discussion of Alliance Airport, see infra notes 319-324 and accompany-
ing text.
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Field. 4 ° Carter concluded that consumers would benefit
in a broad range of ways.
First, he noted that repeal of the Amendment would
probably result in reductions of the price of airline tickets
to and from the Dallas-Fort Worth area. 24 ' Two factors
would. cause this result. First, DFW airlines would face
new competitors for routes not previously served by Love
Field. Southwest Airlines, for instance, could offer serv-
ices to destinations beyond the Love Field Service
Area. 42 A second way in which repeal of the Wright
Amendment could lower ticket prices would be a reduc-
tion of the cost of economic rents embedded in the pric-
ing of airline tickets at DFW.243 When DFW operates at
capacity, the shortage of gates and other scarce airport fa-
cilities may give rise to "scarcity rents." "In other words,
if DFW cannot keep up with growing demand, airline
ticket prices could increase to reflect these scarcities. '" 244
240 Testimony of Carter, supra note 157 at 2. Carter described the FTC's pur-
pose as follows:
The Federal Trade Commission is an independent regulatory
agency which for 75 years has been charged with the responsibility
of protecting competition and safeguarding the interests of consum-
ers. Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act prohibits unfair
methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices.
Pursuant to this mandate, the Commission seeks to serve the public
interest by, among other things, protecting the marketplace from
unreasonable restraints of trade. Upon request by federal, state, and
local governmental bodies, the FTC staff regularly assesses the com-
petitive impact of legislative and regulatory proposals in order to
identify provisions that may benefit consumers by promoting com-
petition and reducing prices, and provisions that may harm consum-
ers by impairing competition or increasing costs without offering
offsetting benefits.
Id. at 3-4. See also supra note 211.
24 Id. at 12.
242 Id. at 12-13.
243 Id. at 13.
24 Id. "Removal of restrictions at Love Field will increase available airport facil-
ities, which is likely to erode any economic rents embedded in the pricing of air-
line tickets at D/FW." Id. In explaining the concept of "scarcity rents," Carter
states, "When a factor of production, such as an airport gate, is in fixed supply,
increases in the demand for that factor will cause its price to rise. If this factor is
already earning a competitive return before the price increase, the additional rev-
enue generated by this price is termed a "scarcity rent." Id. at 13 n.32.
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Removal of the restrictions at Love Field would make
more airport facilities available, and thus prevent the oc-
currence of "scarcity rents."
To support his argument, Carter analyzed current ticket
prices, comparing fares for routes affected by the Wright
Amendment to those unaffected by it.245 The results re-
veal that if Southwest Airlines could compete from Love
Field with the airlines at DFW on routes to destinations
prohibited by the Wright Amendment, ticket prices to
those destinations would decrease.
In his analysis Carter compared the fares of Southwest,
the major carrier at Love Field, and American, the major
carrier at DFW. The FTC study found that where the two
airlines served the same destinations, their ticket prices
were substantially the same.246 For example, at the time
of the study, the lowest price for a roundtrip Southwest
flight from Love Field to either Little Rock, Houston,
Austin, or San Antonio was $38.247 American's lowest
priced fares from DFW to these cities was also $38.248
The FTC also noted that Southwest's and American's low-
est priced flights from Houston to Nashville, Birmingham,
and St. Louis-cities outside the Love Field Service
Area-are identically priced at $98.249 Comparisons be-
tween regular priced fares also reflect substantially similar
pricing structures between the two airlines.2 50 From these
comparisons it is clear that when Southwest and American
serve the same city-pairs, they generally offer a similar
range of fares. These figures suggest that if Southwest
were allowed to fly to destinations beyond the current
Love Field Service Area, American would price similarly
to Southwest on flights from DFW to these
destinations.5I
245 Id. at 12-18.
246 Id. at 17.




251 Id. at 16-17.
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The FTC study next compared American's prices on
routes from DFW to destinations that Southwest cannot
serve from Love Field with prices on routes from Houston
to these same destinations.252 The study looked specifi-
cally at American's fares from DFW to Kansas City, Nash-
ville, Birmingham, and St. Louis as well as American and
Southwest fares from Houston to these same cities.253
The lowest available fares from Houston to Kansas City,
Nashville, Birmingham, or St. Louis were significantly
lower than the fares from DFW to these destinations. For
instance, the lowest available fare from the Houston area
to St. Louis was $98 and the lowest available fare from
Dallas to St. Louis was $200.254 Full fare differentials
were even larger. In fact, full fares from DFW were, in
some instances, four times more than full fares originat-
ing in Houston.255 For example, the fare from Houston to
Nashville was $168; the same airline's fare from Dallas to
Nashville was $672.256
The FTC's statistics show that, when serving the same
city-pairs, Southwest and American have similar fares.
Additionally, prices from DFW to destinations that cannot
be served from Love Field are substantially higher than
fares from Houston to these same destinations (where
Southwest does have routes matching American). As
Carter concluded, this evidence "suggests that removal of
restrictions may lower fares to consumers flying into and
out of Dallas. '2 5 7 This same conclusion was also reached
by a private study commissioned by the City of Dallas.258
252 Id. at 17. The study used Houston as a comparison city for several reasons.
Both Dallas and Houston have a newer regional airport and an older in-town air-
port. Id. at 14. Also, "the distances of the routes to the listed destinations are
comparable, and the cities are of comparable size and location." Id. at 14-15.




257 Id. at 17-18.
258 REESE AND COMPANY, THE IMPACT ON AIR TRAFFIC AcTiViTY AT DALLAS LOVE
FIELD RESULTING FROM REPEAL OF THE WRIGHT AMENDMENT Uuly 31, 1989) (avail-
able on file at the Journal of Air Law and Commerce).
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That study indicated that once Southwest is allowed to
compete with the airlines at DFW for routes outside of the
Love Field Service Area, the major carriers at DFW would
most likely increase the availability of lower priced and
less restrictive fares as necessary to counter any loss of
passenger traffic.2 5
2. Reductions in Delay Time
A second major way in which consumers would benefit
from repeal of the Wright Amendment would be a reduc-
tion of delay time suffered by passengers flying into and
out of the Dallas-Fort Worth area. There are many indi-
cations that DFW is approaching capacity level.2 ° One
indication of this problem is that delay time is increasing
at DFW. 26 1 Delay time is the time imposed on passengers
on flights waiting to use a runway.262 One of the major
causes of delay time is airport volume.26 3 FAA statistics
259 Id. at 10. Concern at the local level over the Wright Amendment's effect on
air fares to and from Dallas-Fort Worth area is well evidenced by a small article in
D Magazine, a Dallas based magazine which focuses on current events and issues in
Dallas and the surrounding area. D Magazine concluded that the Wright Amend-
ment costs consumers money by preventing Southwest Airlines from competing
with the major airlines at DFW. Posey, Something 'Spensive in the Air, D MAGAZINE,
Mar. 1990, at 28. To support this conclusion, D Magazine compared DFW air fares
to selected cities (outside of the Love Field Area) with the fares of cities that allow
full competition between the budget airlines and the major airlines. This study
compared the lowest round-trip rates to selected cities from Austin, Oklahoma
City, Tulsa, and Dallas as of February 3, 1990.
DESTINATIONS DEPARTURE CITIES
AUS OKC TUL DFW
Birmingham 88 T
Las Vegas $138 $158 $198 $298
Los Angeles $130 $150 $170 $238
Nashville $118 $124 $149 $238
Phoenix $118 $148 $148 $278
San Diego $158 $178 $178 $338Id.
260 Zimmerman & Stahl, supra note 208 (citing the need for additional runways
and gates at DFW).
26, Nather, supra note 213; see Testimony of Carter, supra note 157, at 18. See
generally FAA Daily Aircraft Operations, DFW and DAL, Jan.-July 1989. For fur-
ther discussion of the delay problem at DFW, see supra note 213 and accompany-
ing text.
2 2 Testimony of Carter, supra note 157 at 18-19.
263 Id. at 19.
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reveal that DFW suffered over 5300 delays from March
through July 1989.21 Approximately 18% of this delay
time was attributable to airport volume. 26 5
The FTC noted in its report that "a reduction in opera-
tions when an airport is near its capacity can have a signifi-
cant impact on delay time. '266  One particular study
estimated that if there were twenty departures per runway
per hour, a 1 % increase in commercial air carrier depar-
tures would cause an increase in the average delay of
2.9%.267 Likewise, if there were twenty arrivals per run-
way in the same hour, a 1% increase in commercial air
carrier arrivals per runway would increase departure de-
lays by an additional 1.6%.268 These statistics suggest
that delay time may be reduced by decreasing traffic vol-
ume at peak hours.
The overcrowded situation at DFW, on the other hand,
is in marked contrast to that at Love Field. Once the
eighth busiest airport in the country,269 Love Field cur-
rently operates far below capacity level.2 7 In 1973, Love
Field enplaned over 6.6 million passengers.2 7 In 1988,
that number was under 2.5 million.2 72 The FAA estimates
that Love Field can accommodate approximately twice as
many flights as it handled in 1988.273 Furthermore, the
FAA notes that from March throughJuly 1989, Love Field




267 MORRISON & WINSTON, Enhancing the Performance of the Deregulated Air Transpor-
tation System, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC Aciviirv 61 (M. Bailey & C.
Winston ed. 1989) (cited in Testimony of Carter, supra note 157, at 20 n.42).
21 Testimony of Carter, supra note 157, at 19-20.
269 Zimmerman, supra note 34.
270 Testimony of Carter, supra note 157, at 20.
271 Passenger Activity Dallas Love Field, Dallas Love Field Circular (1989)
(available on file at the Journal of Air Law and Commerce).
272 Id.
273 Zimmerman, Field of Dreams, Dallas Morning News, July 18, 1989, at DI, col.
4.
274 Testimony of Carter, supra note 157, at 20 (citing FAA Daily Aircraft Opera-
tions, DFW and DAL, Jan.-July 1989).
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tributed to airport volume.2 75
The comparison between flight delays at DFW and
Love Field suggests that, if flights were allocated more ef-
ficiently between the two airports, all passengers to and
from the Dallas-Fort Worth area would suffer less delay
time. For example, the FTC study concluded that two
types of passengers will benefit if operations are ex-
panded at Love Field: (1) those passengers who shift from
using DFW to the below-capacity Love Field and (2) the
passengers who continue to use DFW after its excess traf-
fic is shifted to Love Field.276 Specifically, the study indi-
cated that if 10% of the commercial flights to and from
DFW were transferred to Love Field, the passengers re-
maining at DFW would save over $19.3 million in reduced
delays.277 Under the same formula, the passengers who
shift to Love Field would save about $6.8 million per year
in reduced delays.2 78 This is a clear example where, if the
Dallas-Fort Worth area utilized all of its available re-
sources, the overall quality of commercial air passenger
service would improve.
Critics will, of course, argue that any shifting of traffic
away from DFW is harmful to DFW. This argument fails,
however, because the long-term goal for DFW should be
to find the level of operations at which it operates most
efficiently and profitably, and should not be to simply
maximize the number of flights in and out of DFW. To
the extent that Love Field can be utilized in order to more
effectively allocate flights between the two airports, DFW
will only benefit from expansion of operations at Love
Field.
275 Id.
276 Id. at 25-26.
277 Id at 27. This computation is based on the assumptions that the average
delay at DFW is 10 minutes, the elasticity of delay with respect to operations
equals three, and the average value of passengers' time equals $10 per hour. Id.
at 25-26.
278 Id. at 26.
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3. Savings in Commuting To and From the Airport and
Reduced Parking Rates
Commuting and parking rates represent two final areas
where consumers can expect savings after repeal of the
Wright Amendment.2 79 Love Field is ten miles closer to
downtown Dallas than DFW. The large number of pas-
sengers who commute from downtown to DFW would ex-
perience significant long term savings if they could use
Love Field. The FTC study notes that passengers com-
muting from downtown could save, in reduced travel time
alone, up to an estimated two million dollars per year. 8 0
The FTC further concludes that there are substantial di-
rect costs in travelling the ten additional miles to DFW.
Passengers who shift from DFW to Love Field could po-
tentially save over three million dollars per year in out-of-
pocket expenses.8 1
Consumers will also save on airport parking rates if traf-
279 See id. at 21-23.
2 8 Id. at 21-22. In reaching this figure, the FTC study states:
D/FW is approximately 10 miles farther from downtown Dallas than
Love Field. We assume that, on average, the commute to Love Field
is 12 minutes shorter than the commute to D/FW. If we assume that
5% of the operations move from D/FW to Love Field, that 30% of
the passengers on these flights are travelling to or from downtown
Dallas, and that passenger time is valued at $10/hr, then the savings
to these passengers would equal $1,228,868 per year .... This esti-
mate depends on the speed of travel and the number of passengers
affected by the shift in operations. For example, if 10% of the oper-
ations shift from D/FW to Love Field the savings would increase to
$2,457,736.
Id. at 29 (citations omitted).
28, Id. at 22. The study summarized its conclusions:
[W]e assume that the direct costs of traveling affects 30% of the pas-
sengers who would use flights from Love Field instead of D/FW. If
it costs $0.25 per mile to commute, then the additional passengers
that would use Love Field save an additional $1,536,086 .... As in
our [analysis of savings in commuting time], the savings will depend
upon the percentage of the operations that shift from D/FW to Love
Field, as well as upon the direct costs of traveling the additional
miles. For example, in the above scenario, if 10% of air carrier op-
erations shift from D/FW to Love Field, the savings would be
$3,072,171.
Id. at 29-30.
fic shifts from DFW to Love Field. 82 The daily parking
rate close to the terminal at DFW is $10. At Love Field,
however, where all parking is near the terminal, the daily
covered garage rate is $6 while outside parking is
$4.50.85 DFW does have remote parking at rates compa-
rable to those at Love Field, but these lots necessarily re-
quire that ground transportation be utilized to get to the
terminal, thus involving additional time and inconven-
ience. As a result, increased operations at Love Field
would potentially save passengers in airport parking fees.
C. Economic Impact of Repeal of the Wright Amendment
Love Field is a tremendous economic asset to the Dal-
las-Fort Worth economy. In December 1989, the North
Central Texas Council of Governments released a study
on Love Field's role in the Dallas economy. That study
revealed that Love Field has an annual economic impact
of $2 billion.284 Additionally, over twenty-four thousand
jobs are attributable to Love Field.2 15  These figures
demonstrate the great economic value of Love Field to
the surrounding area.
Although Love Field has a significant impact on the sur-
rounding economy, its true economic potential is substan-
tially constrained by the Wright Amendment. In July
1989, the City of Dallas commissioned a study to deter-
mine the additional economic impact that would result
282 See generally id. at 22-23.
283 Id.
284 North Central Texas Council of Governments, Economic Impact of Dallas
Love Field (Dec. 1988) (available on file at the Journal of Air Law and Commerce).
Direct impacts totaled $467,930,000. Id. at 4. Direct impacts include expendi-
tures by firms that carry passengers, firms that serve the general aviation function,
governmental agencies which support aviation, the ground transport firms, firms
tht maintain aircraft and others. Id. at 3. Indirect impacts, including expenditures
made by air passengers who visit the region, expenditures by the region's resi-
dents, and value added impacts of firms that depend on the airport totaled
$291,819,000. Id. at 3-4. Finally, induced economic impacts, resulting from the
"multiplier effect," totaled $1,241,955,000. Id. at 3-4. The multiplier effect was
determined using the multiplier coefficients specific to the Dallas/Fort Worth re-
gion. Id.
285 Id. at 13.
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from repeal of the Wright Amendment. 286 The study re-
sults were expressed in terms of additional economic im-
pact that would have occurred in 1987 had the operating
restrictions not been in effect.287 The study first predicted
that direct economic expenditures would have been al-
most $5 million greater had the Wright Amendment not
been in effect. 2 8  The indirect costs of the Amendment,
however, were even greater; the study concluded that visi-
tor expenditures such as lodging, food, and ground trans-
portation would have been almost $80 million greater,
but for the restrictions. 2 9 Finally, the study calculated the
induced impacts, based on the "multiplier effect" of
respending the direct and indirect funds throughout the
local economy. This amount was close to $139 million. 90
In totaling these figures, the study concluded that the
Wright Amendment, in 1987 alone, cost the Dallas area
286 WILBUR SMITH ASSOCIATES, ADDITIONAL ECONOMIC IMPACTS ON LOVE FIELD
AS A RESULT OF REPEAL OF THE WRIGHT AMENDMENT (Aug. 14, 1989) (available on
file at the Journal of Air Law and Commerce). The study looked at both positive and
negative implications of repeal of the Wright Amendment. The study summa-
rized the negative effects of repeal as follows:
It can be expected that the increased economic activity would be ac-
companied by some negative impacts. This would result from in-
creased ground traffic in the Love Field vicinity, and increased air
carrier flight operations. However, activity levels would remain con-
siderably below those that were experienced prior to the opening of
Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport. Also, these impacts would
be mitigated to some extent by the Love Field fleet mix requirement
to use quieter Stage 3 aircraft and by current and forecast improved
motor vehicle emissions performance, which reduces air pollutants.
Id. at 6-7.
287 Id. at 1.
288 Id. at 2.










2-0 Id. at 6.
$223,547,000.291 The study further found that the in-
creased economic activity would result in the creation of
over four thousand jobs in the surrounding area. 92 The
vast majority of jobs would be created in the hospitality
industry, although some additional jobs would be located
at Love Field itself.293
VI. AFTER THE WRIGHT AMENDMENT: MINIMIZING
AIRPORT NOISE
During 1989, the wisdom of the Wright Amendment
faced intensified scrutiny. Legislation was introduced in
Congress to repeal the Amendment. 294 The Dallas City
Council, moreover, issued a resolution calling for replace-
ment of the Amendment with a 650-mile perimeter rule
very similar to the perimeter rules imposed at National
and LaGuardia airports. 295 The wide range of benefits
that would result from the total lifting of restrictions at
Love Field demonstrates that ample room exists for the
improvement of the quality of air carrier service in the
Dallas-Fort Worth area.
Nevertheless, strong opposition to repeal of the Wright
Amendment has developed during the course of public
debate. 296 Fear of increased noise and congestion has
caused neighborhood groups near Love Field to oppose
the Amendment's repeal. 97 Indeed, one study has shown




2- See generally Dunham, Love Field Debate Hits Washington, Dallas Times Herald,
Nov. 11, 1989, at A19, col. 5.
295 Dallas, Tex., Resolution 893150 (Sept. 27, 1989) (available on file at the
Journal of Air Law and Commerce). The city later rescinded the resolution because of
fear that repeal of the Wright Amendment would hurt DFW and increase noise at
Love Field.
2 See Brumley, supra note 237; Austin, All's Fair in War Over Love, Neighbors Vow
to Fight New Flights, Dallas Times Herald, Sept. 3, 1989, at A25, col. 2.
297 The town council of one nearby community, Highland Park, unanimously
passed a resolution opposing repeal of the Wright Amendment. Zethraus, HP
Gives Backing to Love Rule, Council Opposes Repeal of Wright Amendment, Dallas Morn-
ing News, Oct. 18, 1989, at A29, col. 1; see also, Zethraus, Clamoring for Quiet, High-
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nificant noise increase in the surrounding areas if Love
Field is allowed to reach capacity. 298 Reduction of noise
pollution is a common and valid reason for implementa-
tion of perimeter rules. 99
Congress, however, did not tailor the current restric-
tions to minimize noise. 0° Imposing restrictions on flight
destinations may be an effective tool for protecting DFW,
but it is an exceedingly inefficient method of controlling
noise pollution. Any change in noise levels after repeal of
the Wright Amendment will occur as a result of increases
in the aggregate number of operations, not as a result of
changes in the origins and destinations of the additional
flights.3 ' It should be noted, moreover, that an increase
in traffic does not necessarily imply a corresponding in-
crease in noise; old and noisy Stage 2 aircraft are slowly
being phased out and replaced by newer and quieter
Stage 3 aircraft. 0
Incidental noise reduction is no reason, in and of itself,
to maintain the Wright Amendment. If Congress or the
Dallas City Council believes that Love Field should be
constrained in order to protect the quality of life in the
area surrounding Love Field, then new restrictions should
be imposed which are more rationally related to that pur-
pose. As a practical matter, the opposition groups un-
land Park Marshaling Opposition to a Noiser, Busier Love Field, Dallas Morning News,
Oct. 14, 1989, at A33, col. 1 [hereinafter Zethraus, Clamoring for Quiet].
198 HARRIS MILLER MILLER & HANSON INC., supra note 228, at 4-6. Interestingly,
this same study predicted that in the year 2000, based upon predicted growth
rates for an unrestricted Love Field, there would be no noticeable increase in
noise above the 1986 levels. Id. at 4-5. The study concludes that the increases in
total activity would be largely offset by a shift toward more modern and quieter
Stage 3 aircraft. Id. at 5-6.
2- Noise control was a significant factor in the decision to implement perimeter
rules at both National and LaGuardia Airports. See supra notes 73, 96 and accom-
panying text.
- See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
10, See generally Testimony of Carter, supra note 157, at 12.
102 See HARRIS MILLER MILLER & HANSON INC., supra note 228, at 5. In 1986,
Stage 3 aircraft accounted for 40% of all operations at Love Field and 47% of
those at night. Id. In the 1990 forecast, the percentages are 66% and 47% re-
spectively. Id. Furthermore, in the 1995 forecast, Stage 3 aircraft are expected to
account for 79% of all operations and 65% of those at night. Id.
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doubtedly support the Wright Amendment not because it
is good legislation, but out of fear that it will not be re-
placed with new restrictions, or if such restrictions are put
in place, they will not be as restrictive as the Wright
Amendment. Such fear should not stand in the way of
overhauling outdated, overly-restrictive legislation such
as the Wright Amendment.
Before considering the types of restrictions that should
replace the Wright Amendment, the focus should be on
determining which level of government is best suited to
impose those restrictions. The current Love Field restric-
tions were imposed by Congress to protect DFW.3 °3 Be-
cause this purpose has been achieved,3 0 4 any new
restrictions enacted to replace the Wright Amendment
would likely be designed to serve a different goal-noise
control.
If noise control is indeed the purpose for implementa-
tion of a new perimeter rule and other restrictions, Con-
gress and Love Field's proprietor, the City of Dallas, must
seriously inquire whether Congress is the appropriate
body to issue such regulations. As the current attempt to
repeal the Wright Amendment demonstrates, Congress is
often too slow to respond and too detached from local
concerns to adequately regulate a particular airport. The
local proprietor is in a superior position to (1) consider
the actual air service needs of the community and (2)
quickly re-evaluate the restrictions it imposes as those
needs change.3 0 5 This view was adopted by the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals in British Airways Board v. Port Au-
thority,30 6 which stated, "[t]he inherently local aspect of
noise control can be most effectively left to the operator,
as the unitary local authority who controls airport access.
sos See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
-04 See supra notes 207-238 and accompanying text.
,05 See British Airways Bd. v. Port Auth., 558 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1977) [hereinafter
British Airways I]; see also Global Int'l Airways v. Port Auth., 727 F.2d 246, modified,
731 F.2d 126 (2d Cir. 1984) (permitting local proprietor to require air carriers to
utilize newer technology).
s- British Airways 1, 558 F.2d at 75.
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It has always seemed fair to assume that the operator will
act in a rational manner in weighing the commercial bene-
fits of proposed service against its costs, both economic
and political. ' 307
If Congress repealed the Wright Amendment, the City
of Dallas would be acting well within its authority by draft-
ing and adopting its own perimeter rule or other restric-
tions so long as the new restrictions did not unduly
burden interstate commerce or inhibit the accomplish-
ment of national goals. 30 8 Although noise regulations im-
posed by the local proprietor may face a higher level of
judicial scrutiny than do federal statutes,30 9 the right of
the local proprietor to impose such restrictions has been
repeatedly upheld. 0
307 British Airways 1, 558 F.2d at 83; see also British Airways Bd. v. Port Auth., 564
F.2d 1002, 1011 (2d Cir. 1977) [hereinafter British Airways II] (stating that "[i]t
seemed fair to assume that the proprietor's intimate knowledge of local condi-
tions, as well as his ability to acquireproperty and air easements and assure com-
patible land use .... would result in a rational weighing of the costs and benefits
of the proposed service.").
5o See British Airways /, 564 F.2d at 1010-11; see also City of Houston v. FAA,
679 F.2d 1184, 1196 (5th Cir. 1982); Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Port Auth. of N.Y.
& NJ., 658 F. Supp. 952, 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd, 817 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1987);
Blackman & Freeman, Environmental Consequences of Municipal Airports: A Subject of
Federal Mandate?, 53 J. AIR L. & CoM. 375, 389-96 (1987) (discussing scope of
judicial review of noise and access regulations). The Fifth Circuit in City of Houston
stated,
We find that the FAA, acting in its proprietary capacity as the owner/
operator of National and Dulles, had express authority under the
Federal Aviation Act to promulgate reasonable regulations concern-
ing the efficient use of the navigable airspace. The perimeter rule
falls within its grasp as a means of promoting such efficiency.
City of Houston, 679 F.2d at 1196. The Western Air Lines court concluded, "[I]n the
absence of conflict with FAA regulations, a perimeter rule, as imposed by the Port
Authority to manage congestion in a multi-airport system, serves an equally legiti-
mate local need and fits comfortably within that limited role, which Congress has
reserved to the local proprietor." Western Air Lines, 658 F. Supp. at 960.
-00 See supra note 117 and accompanying text. But see Blackman & Freeman,
supra note 311, at 389-96. Blackman and Freeman argue that courts generally
apply a deferential standard of review to noise control regulations imposed by
local proprietors. Id. They contend that this is the correct approach because the
local proprietor is in a superior position to the federal government to determine
acceptable levels of noise pollution. Id.
10 City of Houston, 679 F.2d at 1196 (upholding perimeter rule at National Air-
port imposed by FAA, the local proprietor); British Airways I, 558 F.2d at 85-86
(upholding local proprietor's temporary ban on SST flights at Kennedy Airport);
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A local perimeter rule would also have several advan-
tages. First, it would insure that the people who bear the
costs of unrestricted air traffic-citizens living near Love
Field-have a convenient forum in which to protect their
interests. Second, the local proprietor is in a superior po-
sition to weigh those costs against the corresponding ben-
efits enjoyed by consumers when air traffic services are
left unrestricted. If the perimeter rule is drafted at the
local level, the parties most affected by it, both positively
and negatively, have a role in its creation.
Clearly the party who would most strongly oppose
granting Dallas more control over its own airport would
Western Air Lines, 658 F. Supp. at 958 (upholding perimeter rule at LaGuardia Air-
port imposed by local proprietor); Aircraft Owners & Pilots Ass'n v. Port Auth.,
305 F. Supp. 93 (E.D.N.Y. 1969) (upholding local proprietor's imposition of a
"takeoff" fee on certain small aircraft for the purpose of reducing airport conges-
tion).
The major case cited as a limitation on the power of municipal authorities to
impose noise restrictions is City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S.
624 (1973). There, the Court struck down a municipal ordinance which imposed
a curfew on jet air traffic at a local airport. Id. The Court ruled that the municipal
ordinance was preempted due to the "pervasive nature of the scheme of federal
regulation of aircraft noise." Id. at 633. The precedential effect of this case, how-
ever, is limited. The City of Burbank was not the actual proprietor of the airport
but instead used its governmental powers, or police powers, to impose limits on
the airport. The Court explicitly refused to address the existence of any limita-
tions on a municipality's authority to impose noise regulations when acting as the
airport's proprietor. Id. at 635 n.14; see also Western Air Lines, 658 F. Supp. at 956
(distinguishing City of Burbank on these grounds). The Court, in limiting the
breadth of its holding, noted a letter by the Secretary of Transportation, which
was quoted with approval in the Senate Report on section 611 of the Federal
Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1431 (1970), which stated that
[Tihe proposed legislation will not affect the rights of a State or local
public agency, as the proprietor of an airport, from issuing regulations
or establishing requirements as to the permissable level of noise
which can be created by aircraft using the airport. Airport owners
acting as proprietors can presently deny the use of their airports to air-
craft on the basis of noise considerations so long as such exclusion is
nondiscriminatory.
City of Burbank, 411 U.S. at 635 n.14 (quoting S. REP. No. 1353, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess. 6 (1968)). Based on the limiting language in City of Burbank, several courts
have held that a municipality may impose noise regulations when acting as a pro-
prietor. See, e.g., Santa Monica Airport Ass'n v. City of Santa Monica, 659 F.2d
100, 104 (9th Cir. 1981); British Airways 1, 558 F.2d at 83. For a further dis-
cusssion of the limitations of City of Burbank, see Blackman & Freeman, supra note
311, at 381-87.
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be the City of Fort Worth. Fort Worth officials contend
that any growth in services at Love Field will harm their
investment in DFW.3 1 ' By keeping the regulation of Love
Field in the hands of the national government, Fort
Worth is able to retain some political control over Love
Field.3 12
Fort Worth's concerns, however, should not be allowed
to block the revamping of the restrictions at Love Field or
the granting of more control to Dallas. As a practical mat-
ter, Love Field will never challenge the success of DFW.
Dallas has its own reasons for preventing Love Field from
expanding too much. Dallas itself incurred substantial
levels of debt in developing DFW and has a vested inter-
est in its success. 3  Also, several large residential com-
munities now surround Love Field.31 4 The citizens who
oppose unrestricted growth at Love Field are large in
number and politically well-organized.3 5 The presence
of large groups of local citizens adversely affected by Love
Field guarantees that Love's growth will always be
constrained.
Another reason why Fort Worth's concerns should not
prevent Dallas from acquiring more control over Love
Field is that the vast majority of people significantly im-
pacted by Love Field reside in Dallas. The number of
Dallas citizens affected by repeal of the Wright Amend-
,,I See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
,,2 Undoubtedly, control decreased significantly when 12th District Congress-
man Jim Wright, from Fort Worth, resigned as Speaker of the House of Repre-
sentatives in 1989.
,,- In total, the DFW Airport Board has been responsible for 36 bond issues
that have raised $1.94 billion, including almost $1.4 billion in debt outstanding.
The Airport Board recommends the sale of bonds for different projects; however,
the cities of Dallas and Fort Worth actually issue the securities. Weiss, Bond Issues
Pave the Way for Growth, Dallas Morning News, Jan. 8, 1989, at KI 1, col. 1.
-14 Dallas City Councilwoman Lori Palmer, who represents much of the area
surrounding Love Field, notes that 40,000 people are affected by noise at the
airport. Collins, Love Field Limits Costly, Council Told, Dallas Times Herald, Sept. 6,
1989, at A17, col. 2.
31.5 See Zethraus, Clamoring for Quiet, supra note 297; Collins, supra note 317, at
A17, col. 2; Austin, supra note 296. One organization, the Love Field Citizens
Action Committee, hints that it may file suit against the city if Love Field is ex-
panded. Id. Austin, supra note 297.
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ment, and the extent to which they will be affected, is
large. Fort Worth citizens, on the other hand, are much
less directly affected by the happenings at Love Field.
Even if Fort Worth's interest in DFW is somehow harmed
by an expanded Love Field, the detriment suffered by
Fort Worth pales in comparison to the corresponding
benefit enjoyed by Dallas.
Finally, Fort Worth's position on Love Field is particu-
larly untenable in light of the fact that Fort Worth itself is
currently constructing a new airport, Alliance Airport, just
sixteen miles from DFW. t6 Intended as an industrial
cargo airport, Alliance boasts a 9600-foot runway-the
nation's biggest new runway since DFW opened in
1974. s ty Thus far, Fort Worth has committed $32 million
dollars to its construction. 1 i Alliance has already begun
to compete with DFW for industrial and cargo distribu-
tion business.3 19 For example, American Airlines is build-
ing a $400 million maintenance base at Alliance;3 20 DFW
had originally been considered the prime candidate for
the base.32 ' Indeed, it is ironic that Fort Worth, while
building and promoting a new airport of its own, attempts
to block expansion at Love Field by arguing that such ex-
pansion will harm DFW.
Ultimately, then, control over Love Field should be left
-16 See generally Friend, Alliance of Visionaries, Dallas Times Herald, Dec. 10, 1989,
at DI, col. 1. Alliance Airport will serve as the centerpiece of an 18 thousand-acre
industrial development project. Id. The project is a joint public-private partner-
ship between The Perot Group, the Federal Aviation Administration, and the City
of Fort Worth. Id. The City of Fort Worth will own the airport, but intends to
contract with The Perot Group for management. Id.
17 Id.
B18 Id.
119 See generally Steffy, Feeling the Force of Competition, Observers Say D/FWJust Begin-
ning to See the Magnetic Powers of Alliance Airport, Dallas Bus. J. Bus. Press, Nov. 1989,
at 2B, col. 1. Steffy discusses the developing competition between Alliance and
DFW for industrial and cargo distribution business. Steffy notes that United Par-
cel Service is currently debating whether to locate its new regional hub at DFW or
Alliance. Id. The importance of cargo operations to DFW is underscored by the
fact that DFW is currently devoting about 65% of its development efforts to in-
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to its proprietor, the City of Dallas. Once the Wright
Amendment is repealed, the City of Dallas could deter-
mine what restrictions to place on Love Field. In this re-
gard, one can expect that noise control considerations
would be paramount. Some of those restrictions include
(1) a perimeter rule prohibiting nonstop flights to or from
Love Field in excess of 650 miles, (2) differential landing
fees for Stage 3 and Stage 2 aircraft, and (3) construction
of ground barriers to reduce noise.3 2 Indeed, a host of
factors would determine what restrictions are placed on
Love Field. The citizens of Dallas would bring a broad
range of views to the discussion over the proper level of
restrictions at Love Field. Importantly, so long as the re-
strictions are imposed at the local level, problems such as
those caused by the Wright Amendment will be more eas-
ily avoided in the future. Local residents and consumers
would have a convenient forum to express their views.
Furthermore, when local air travel conditions change, ex-
isting restrictions could be reevaluated more quickly and
efficiently.
VII. CONCLUSION
Congress passed the Wright Amendment because of
fear that continued use of Love Field would hinder the
growth of DFW. To help insure DFW's success, Congress
prohibited commercial air carriers from providing service
between Love Field and destinations outside of Texas and
its four surrounding states.
Although protection of DFW was, at the time, a legiti-
mate goal, there is a strong argument that the means cho-
sen exceed the bounds prescribed by the Constitution.
The Supreme Court has long recognized a fundamental
right to interstate travel. The Wright Amendment in-
fringes on that right by making travel from Dallas to states
outside the Love Field Service Area less convenient and
more costly. Both the substantive due process doctrine
-122 Dallas, Texas, Resolution 893150 (Sept. 27, 1989).
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and equal protection doctrine require that infringements
on a fundamental right serve a compelling state interest
and be the least restrictive method of serving that interest.
The Wright Amendment fails this difficult standard be-
cause less restrictive alternatives, such as those found at
National and LaGuardia airports, are available. The
Wright Amendment is also potentially unconstitutional as
a violation of the port preference clause, which prohibits
Congress from favoring the ports of one state over the
ports of another.
Regardless of whether a court finds the Wright Amend-
ment constitutional, however, Congress should repeal it.
The airport once perceived as needing protection from
Love Field in order to establish itself is today the second
busiest airport in the world. DFW no longer needs the
protection of the Wright Amendment. In fact, because of
DFW's tremendous growth, airport officials are currently
contemplating a massive expansion at DFW. In this era of
burgeoning air travel to and from the Dallas-Fort Worth
metropolitan area, it makes little sense to restrain Love
Field so tightly. Love Field's resources will remain un-
derutilized so long as the Wright Amendment remains in
place.
Many opponents of repeal maintain that the Wright
Amendment is necessary as a limit on noise pollution.
The growth of residential neighborhoods around Love
Field undoubtedly means that reasonable noise restric-
tions are needed at Love Field. The Wright Amendment,
however, is an extremely poor device to accomplish this
purpose. There is little or no correlation between the ori-
gins and destinations of flights serving Love Field and the
noise levels suffered by the surrounding neighborhoods.
The Wright Amendment is the wrong solution. It should
not remain in place merely because it has the incidental
effect of reducing noise.
New restrictions, more rationally related to the purpose
of reducing noise pollution, are needed at Love Field.
Which level of government should impose the restrictions
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that replace the Wright Amendment, however, is as im-
portant an issue as the type of restrictions adopted. Per-
haps the single most important lesson of the Wright
Amendment is that Congress is not well suited to impose
the types of restrictions currently in place at Love Field.
A city's air travel needs are subject to change over a rela-
tively short period of time. Congress is too slow to re-
spond to such changes and is often insensitive to the
interests of the parties most affected by the airport restric-
tions. The local airport proprietor is more in tune with
the needs and concerns of the surrounding community
and the consumers who use the airport. Therefore, any
new restrictions on Love Field replacing the Wright
Amendment should be imposed by the City of Dallas, not
Congress. The new restrictions, of course, must be rea-
sonable and cannot hinder the accomplishment of na-
tional goals.
